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ABSTRACT 
 Although many alternatives to the standard model of policing have been 
proposed, none of them meaningfully engages with the massive social and technological 
changes that have occurred since the mid-20th century. This thesis asks if complexity 
theory can serve as a theoretical foundation for a new model of policing. Literature on 
complexity, complex adaptive systems, and network theory is examined and finds that 
observed behavior of street robberies in Washington, DC, can be understood as a 
complex adaptive system. This thesis concludes that it is vital to recognize that the 
United States is transitioning into an informational, network-based society increasingly 
governed by nonlinear, dynamic processes. It also concludes that the present 
dissatisfaction with the state of policing is due to its institutional misalignment with those 
social dynamics. Several recommendations are offered on how to educate and structure 
police agencies to function effectively in complex environments. 
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The dominant model of professional policing in the United States is the so-called 
“standard model,” which coalesced during the 1960s and 1970s.1 Weisburd and Eck have 
identified key characteristics of the standard model of policing as a focus on random patrol, 
rapid response to 911 calls, and reactive criminal investigations.2 Calling it the standard 
model is a deliberate choice, for it denotes that police operations and services have, in large 
part, become standardized. The standard model assumes that a reactive template of policing 
can be applied without regard to the particular circumstances of any given community.3  
The standard model of policing is effectively a design for a production-oriented 
organization. This design is not a surprise, given that it evolved between 1930–1970; a 
time when American industry was crucial to winning the Second World War and 
positioning America as not only a global hegemon, but also the embodiment of capitalism 
during the Cold War. The standard model is industrial in its outlook that directly produces 
reports, investigations, arrests, and prosecutions with the underlying assumption that if 
enough of those goods are produced, a profit of public safety will be realized. Kelling 
observes that the innovators of the Reform Era were following in the footsteps of the 
principles of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management, a system for increasing 
productivity through essentially adopting assembly line techniques.4 Accordingly, police 
procedures were standardized, broken down into constituent steps, and police officers 
trained to perform their specific task efficiently while managers coordinated between 
different “production units” within the departments.5 
 
1 George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, Perspectives on Policing 
(Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal 
Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1988), 2, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/114213.pdf. 
2 David Weisburd and John Eck, “What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?,” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 593, no. 1 (2004): 49.  
3 Weisburd and Eck, 44. 
4 Kelling and Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, 6; Britannica s.v. “Taylorism,” November 15, 
2018. 
5 Kelling and Moore, 6. 
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This reductive, production-oriented worldview falls squarely within a linear 
understanding of problems. Linear problems can be thought of as having three main 
qualities. First, they react in fixed proportions to various inputs. Secondly, they are 
constructed out of independent variables that only affect a limited set of known, dependent 
variables. Thirdly, a linear problem can be understood through reductionist thinking, or 
breaking it down into small individual parts and tallying the interactions of those atomized 
parts. Linear problems can be thought of as a strict math equation; the sum of the variables 
completely describes the problem.6 
However, since the 1970s, an ongoing revolution in communications technology 
has occurred, and people are more widely linked and interconnected than ever before in 
history. These dense webs of connections allow for new, nonlinear types of behaviors. 
Complexity theory is the study of nonlinear dynamic systems, which are formed when large 
numbers of elements, such as people, are able to interact with each other.7 The most 
prominent feature of complex problems is that they do not react proportionately or 
predictably.8 Exact predictions about the behavior of complex systems cannot be made 
because so many circumstances and interactions are occurring that obtaining sufficient 
knowledge about them to make accurate predictions is impossible.9 Variables in complex 
problems continuously link to each other in ways that can overlap and are not fixed. They 
can “link and let go and link again” and therefore cannot be neatly classified into categories 
of independent and dependent.10 Finally, complex problems do not yield to reductionist 
thinking because they feature emergent properties, which transcend individual parts of that 
 
6 Ben Ramalingam, Aid on the Edge of Chaos (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 224–25. 
7 Michael Agar, “Complexity Theory: An Exploration and Overview Based on John Holland’s Work,” 
Field Methods 11, no. 2 (1999): 100; Glenn Walters, Modelling the Criminal Lifestyle: Theorizing at the 
Edge of Chaos (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), vi. 
8 David L. Levy, “Applications and Limitations of Complexity Theory in Organization Theory and 
Strategy,” in Handbook of Strategic Management, ed. Jack Rabin, Gerald J. Miller, and W. Bartley 
Hildreth, 2nd ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2000), 79, 
http://www.faculty.umb.edu/david_levy/complex00.pdf. 
9 Friedrich Hayek, “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” Emergence: Complexity and Organization 
9, no. 1–2 (2007): 157–59.  
10 Agar, “Complexity Theory,” 100. 
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whole and are not simply recreating the properties of the constituent parts at scale.11 As 
linear problems were earlier likened to strict mathematical sums, complex problems are 
noted for being more than the sum of their parts. 
Many of those who investigate complexity across a variety of disciplines are 
discovering that “at the heart of many—if not most—problems of organized complexity 
are network problems.”12 The physicist Albert-Laszlo Barabasi goes a step further in 
establishing the link between complexity and networks: “One thing is increasingly clear: 
no theory of the cell, of social media or of the Internet can ignore the profound network 
effects that their interconnectedness cause. Therefore, if we are ever to have a theory of 
complexity, it will sit on the shoulders of network theory.”13 
Some scholars believe that, due to the Information Revolution, networks are 
becoming the driving force in society. Just as the Industrial Revolution led to industrial 
society, Manuel Castells believes that the IT revolution is leading to an “informational 
society.” The informational society is “oriented towards … the accumulation of knowledge 
and towards higher levels of complexity in information processing.”14 Castells 
acknowledges that people connecting with each other and forming a network is not a new 
phenomenon, but argues that prior to the IT Revolution, networks were limited in ability 
and were outperformed by the forces of hierarchy and centralization in human societies.15 
Since the IT revolution, the capabilities of this new technology have allowed network 
dynamics to explode and overtake the actions of each individual agent within a network.16 
For police agencies practicing the standard model of policing, crime is thought of 
in linear terms, either the actions of scattered individuals or relatively formal hierarchical 
 
11 Hayek, “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” 149. 
12 Ramalingam, Aid on the Edge of Chaos, 192–93. 
13 Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, “The Network Takeover,” Nature Physics 8, no. 1 (January 2012): 15.  
14 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed., vol. 1, The Information Age: Economy, 
Society, and Culture (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 17. 
15 Manuel Castells, “Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society,” The British 
Journal of Sociology 51, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 15. 
16 Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 500. 
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organizations. However, the technological advancements profoundly altering the nature of 
civil society are having the same effects on crime and criminals. This thesis applies a five-
element framework to a street robbery pattern in Washington, DC, and discovers that these 
robberies can be modeled as a complex adaptive system (CAS). In this CAS, individual 
criminals act as decentralized agents, with the cumulative effects of their individual actions 
self-organizing to form an interrelated system that adapts to changes in the environment 
around it, to include law enforcement responses to criminal activity. There are also 
indications that network effects are present, although current police doctrine limits the 
amount of pertinent information collected by police departments. 
There is a growing recognition that the standard model of policing may no longer 
be effective, but there is as yet little appreciation for why that is so. There is no shortage 
of alternative models of policing proposed to replace it, but none has been conceived with 
the changes to the underlying structure and fundamentals of the network society or the 
Information Age in mind. However, at least some of these models suggest practices that 
may serve as building blocks or stepping stones to the day-to-day operations of a 
complexity-based policing model. This thesis examines four of the major alternatives to 
the standard model and finds that to the extent that they recommend practices that are well 
suited to a complex environment, it appears to be either accident or narrowly tailored 
responses to recognized shortcomings of the standard model, and not a coherent, 
theoretically informed understanding of the modern age. However, adopting complexity as 
the theoretical underpinning of a model of policing would provide an internally consistent 
means to integrate elements of these various models and address the shortcomings of the 
standard model of policing. 
It is vital to recognize that society in the United States is transitioning into an 
informational, network-based society increasingly governed by nonlinear, dynamic 
processes. The dissatisfaction with the state of policing occurs since it is an institution that 
is no longer aligned with the dynamics that drive and organize society. Failure to recognize 
this misalignment makes attempting solutions ineffective or inefficient.  
This thesis concludes with recommendations for implementing a complexity-based 
model of policing. First, it recommends educating law enforcement personnel in 
xix 
complexity and network theories, and developing the mindset to work in complex 
environments. Second, it recommends incorporating data analysts into police departments 
as front-line, operational personnel working side-by-side with sworn officers. Finally, it 
offers a number of recommendations about operational changes. Departments should avoid 
structuring themselves around deployment of officers based on geography. Instead, the 
base unit of organization should be squads of officers with integrated analysts. The primary 
tasking of these squads should be investigation and intervention in complex networks and 
systems. Departments need to begin building and formally tracking networks of resources 
that they can bring to bear when they decide that interventions are necessary. All these 
recommendations are intended to orient police agencies towards an informational, rather 
than production-based view of the world. 
  
xx 




Completing this degree program, as well as researching and writing this thesis, 
would not have been possible for me without the assistance of a great many people. I would 
like to thank the command staff of the Metropolitan Police Department for allowing me 
the opportunity to apply for and participate in this opportunity at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. I would like to especially thank Commander Ralph Ennis and Deputy Director 
Jessica Bress for their support and encouragement throughout the entire program. I would 
also like to thank Commander Stuart Emerman for accommodating the demands of this 
program on my schedule and for giving me permission to include the Appendix. Along 
those same lines, I would like to thank all my colleagues at the Third District for picking 
up the slack during the “in-residence” portions of this program. 
I would like to thank the staff of the Center for Homeland Security and the Naval 
Postgraduate School as a whole for the opportunity to participate in this program; I have 
found it both incredibly valuable and fulfilling. A special thanks goes not only to the faculty 
but to the support staff as well—they were incredibly responsive and helped smooth out 
whatever wrinkles appeared in the experience. I also owe a debt of gratitude to all my 
classmates in 1905/1906—your insights, arguments, motivation, friendship, and (sadly, 
due to COVID-19, all too few) conversations at lunches, dinners, and the Trident Room 
really helped define this experience for me.  
I would not have been able to complete this thesis without the help of my 
committee, Dr. Christopher Bellavita, and Dr. Glen Woodbury. Your assistance and 
feedback were most appreciated, and the quality of the final product is due to the 
improvements you both suggested. Any errors that remain are entirely my responsibility. 
Finally, the single person to whom I owe the most thanks is my wife, Sarah. 
Throughout travel, pandemic, riots, the birth of our daughter, more riots, a national 
emergency, and an Inauguration, she remained steadfast that it was important to finish this 
program. Despite all the sacrifices it called for, completing this thesis was as great a priority 
for her as it was for me. I truly could not have done this without her love and support. 
xxii 




A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Speaking in December 2001, Sir John Stevens, former Commissioner of the 
London Metropolitan Police, described the state of policing at the dawn of the 21st century: 
Being a policeman in the 21st Century is like being the man who was 
standing on the bank of a very fast flowing river. In that river he could see 
hundreds of people being swept along struggling to stop from drowning. As 
each moment passes their numbers swell until there are thousands of people 
all gasping and shouting to the man on the bank to help them. 
What do we do as police officers? Go in and help as many as we can? Or 
do we take a walk upstream and find out who is throwing them all in? I have 
a feeling that most of the time police have been wading in to the rescue! 
And so begins a reactive cycle of uncontrolled demand and equally 
uncoordinated response. The police become like lifeguards frantically 
swimming against the tide from one incident to another, employing 
different tactics in a disjointed and unfocussed manner with little or nothing 
to show for it at the end of the day.1 
This assessment of the state of policing was made one year into the 21st century; nearly 20 
years later, it still rings true as the profession of policing largely remains in the cycle of 
uncontrolled demand and uncoordinated response of which Sir Stevens spoke. His words 
came just a few months after the attacks of September 11, 2001, which would see terrorism 
and homeland security concerns become major areas of strategic responsibility for 
American police departments, which added yet another sector of demands for police 
response and attention. The trends towards greater interconnection and globalization have 
only continued since that time, with the invention of smartphones and the rise of social 
media. If systems of dynamic connections are coming to drive both societies and the course 
of global events, will law enforcement strategies rooted in regimented organization still 
prove effective? 
 
1 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing (Cullompton, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2014), 165, 
ProQuest. 
2 
The strategic imperative for policing, which descended from the English tradition, 
has been devising ways to prevent crime rather than efficiently respond to crime.2 
However, the so-called standard model of policing is dominated by methods reactive to 
crimes that have already occurred.3 A number of proposed innovations in policing have 
been implemented to varying degrees by police departments throughout the country. These 
innovations are often implemented and utilized in an ad hoc fashion, and often exist in 
siloes separate from those law enforcement officers engaged in activities prescribed by the 
standard model. It is also not uncommon for departments to mix and match various 
approaches even when they have apparently contradictory features or underlying 
philosophies. In short, the primary tool of police leadership is reactive and thus ill-suited 
for accomplishing the strategic goal of prevention. To the extent that various preventative 
measures have been implemented, the situation more closely resembles the frantic 
lifeguards of Sir Stevens’s metaphor than deliberate strategic moves or considered 
experimentation. 
Modern policing was borne out of the effects of the Industrial Revolution on 
England. The transformation from a rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrial one 
overwhelmed the traditional law enforcement systems in place because they were unsuited 
to the nature of the society in which they found themselves situated.4 Academics, such as 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, have begun to examine contemporary society and posit 
that an Information Revolution has occurred similar in effect and scope to the Industrial 
Revolution. They argue that threats in the Information Age will be fundamentally different 
from those of the previous Industrial Age.5 This difference raises the possibility that 
processes and strategies designed for the Industrial Age may inevitably give way, like 
 
2 John Dempsey and Linda Forst, An Introduction to Policing, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 
2005), 8–9. This imperative was the first of the nine principles enumerated by Sir Robert Peel, generally 
credited as the father of modern policing. 
3 David Weisburd and John Eck, “What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?,” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 593, no. 1 (2004): 44.  
4 Vern Folley, American Law Enforcement, 2nd ed. (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1976), 53–56. 
5 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in Networks and Netwars: 
The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2001), 2.  
3 
traditional English law enforcement before them, to new modes of policing suited to a 
changing society. 
Evidence of friction may have already been seen, in the widely perceived “crisis of 
police legitimacy.” Sparked by outrage and unrest over police use-of-force incidents in 
Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere, President Barrack Obama commissioned a task force 
to study perceived “rifts in the relationships between local police and the communities they 
protect and serve.”6 Implementing one of that task force’s recommendations, President 
Trump formed the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration 
of Justice, which issued its own report on the state of law enforcement in late 2020.7 In his 
remarks while swearing in members of the commission, Attorney General Barr stated the 
need to examine topics, such as technology, mounting social pressures, distrust between 
police and communities, recruitment, and police suicide.8 In a review of two books with 
competing diagnoses of the problems with modern policing, Professor Barry Friedman of 
New York University’s School of Law writes, “Certainty is out of place in policing. . . . 
What’s also needed is a new spirit of innovation in policing that endeavors to get the job 
done while respecting constitutional rights and human dignity.”9  
This legitimacy crisis has not remained confined to political commissions and 
academic debate. Amidst a society stressed and disrupted by a global pandemic, the 
summer and fall of 2020 saw sustained civil unrest. A report issued by the Major Cities 
Chiefs Association found that 8,700 protests occurred in the 68 reporting cities between 
May 25 and July 31, 2020.10 Of those protests, 574 were classified as violent incidents that 
 
6 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing (Washington, DC: Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015), 1. 
7 Tom Jackman, “Attorney General Launches Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement,” 
Washington Post, January 22, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2020/01/22/attorney-
general-barr-launches-presidential-commission-law-enforcement. 
8 Jackman. 
9 Barry Friedman, “The Problem with Modern Policing, as Seen from the Right and from the Left,” 
New York Times, June 27, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/books/review/the-war-on-cops-by-
heather-mac-donald-and-handcuffed-by-malcolm-sparrow.html. 
10 Intelligence Commanders Group, Report on the 2020 Protests & Civil Unrest (Salt Lake City, UT: 
Major Cities Chiefs Association, 2020), 3, 
https://www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/news/mcca_report_on_the_2020_protest_and_civil_unrest.pdf. 
4 
resulted in 2,037 injuries to police officers.11 While many of the summer’s protests were 
associated with the political left in the United States, the riot at the U.S. Capitol saw police 
officers targeted for violence by figures associated with the political right.12 This 
legitimacy crisis spans the political divide, is commanding the attention of the highest 
elected officials in the country, and may itself be a sign that the current institutions of 
policing are ill-matched to society’s current form.  
This thesis examines the ability of complexity theory to address these concerns. 
Complexity theory offers a way for police leadership and policymakers to make sense of 
modern society and the nature of threats and crime within it. Complexity provides a more 
useful description of crime and other issues than existing models do and can serve as a 
basis to compare theories of the changing nature of society. Complexity theory also offers 
a matrix for strategic decision making and provides a framework for rationally integrating 
disparate strains of policing thought and techniques. A model of policing based on 
complexity theory could help policing make the adjustments necessary to adapt to a 
changing society and implement effective and considered strategic moves.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What would a model of policing based on complexity theory look like? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis examines how complexity theory can be used to provide a new model 
of policing better adapted for a changing world than is the current model. Therefore, 
literature has been examined to establish the current understanding two theoretical areas. 
The first area examined is that of complexity, and specifically, the study of complex 
adaptive systems. The second area is modern network theory, which integrates complexity 
into the study of dynamic networks. Closely related to network theory is the theory of 
 
11 Intelligence Commanders Group, 7–10. 
12 Alexander Mallin, Julia Jacobo, and Meredith Deliso, “Capitol Riot Latest: 2 Alleged Proud Boys 




netwar developed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, which examines the behavior of 
networked adversaries in conflict. 
1. Complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems 
Complexity theory is an inter-disciplinary theory that examines how order and 
structure can arise out of the interactions of diverse elements. Warren Weaver is generally 
credited as the father of complexity and his brief paper “Science and Complexity,” 
published in 1948, is viewed as the foundational text.13 Weaver set forth a typology of 
problems, which noted that science had moved from dealing with a handful of variables to 
problems dealing with massive numbers of variables. In between the two lay the relatively 
fertile ground of problems with a middling number of variables, but which displayed 
indications of the organization of those variables being paramount, a state he called 
organized complexity.14 While the terminology has changed and evolved in the 70 years 
since this paper was published, Weaver’s insight into the existence of organized complexity 
was the spark for the development of complexity theory. 
Economists authored two other foundational papers for the development of 
complexity in the 1960s. In his 1962 article, “The Architecture of Complexity,” Herbert 
Simon applied his concept of hierarchy, or interlocking layers of sub-systems nested within 
other sub-systems to a variety of complex systems in different disciplines.15 Simon also 
examined the importance of feedback and information to complex systems.16 Simon’s 
emphasis on structure and hierarchy in complexity is not found in more recent complexity 
literature but has some points in common with the study of networks and complexity. In 
1967, Friedrich Hayek published, “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” in which he 
examined the nature of patterns formed by the relationships among elements in complex 
phenomena. Hayek explained that statistical methods were insufficient to offer meaningful 
 
13 Warren Weaver, “Science and Complexity,” American Scientist 36, no. 4 (October 1948): 536–544. 
14 Weaver, 539. 
15 Herbert Simon, “The Architecture of Complexity,” Emergence: Complexity and Organization 7, no. 
3–4 (2005): 140.  
16 Simon, 139. 
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explanations for the behavior of such complex systems because they could not capture the 
nature of the underlying relationships.17 
The work of physicist Per Bak on his concept of self-organized criticality echoes 
the work of Simon and Hayek. Bak, in his article with Tang and Wiesenfeld, defined self-
organized criticality as the tendency of “dynamical systems with extended spatial degrees 
of freedom [to] naturally evolve into self-organized critical structures of states, which are 
barely stable.”18 The now-standard example used by Bak and Paczuski is that of adding 
grains to a sand pile one at a time. Once the sand pile evolves into a critical state, it 
abandons linearity, and adding a single grain may cause a wildly disproportionate 
avalanche in the pile.19 Bak’s work on the sand pile shows that detailed predictions about 
the future states of systems that have achieved criticality are not possible.20 
One application of complexity theory was the development of complex adaptive 
systems in the mid-1980s. Previous research into complexity had focused on how simple 
elements could form complex structures and exhibit nonlinear and emergent behavior; the 
study of complex adaptive systems sought to explain how such systems would behave after 
they had arisen.21 The work of computer scientist John Holland was foundational to the 
development of a theory of complex adaptive systems. Holland’s work focused on what he 
termed “agent based modeling,” and modeled the behavior of a system of interacting 
agents, whose accumulated interactions display emergent behavior.22 Holland’s work 
focused on creating computer models because their processing power allowed for the 
development of models that could account for greater amounts of complexity.23 Holland 
 
17 Friedrich Hayek, “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” Emergence: Complexity and Organization 
9, no. 1–2 (2007): 143–165.  
18 Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt Wiesenfeld, “Self-Organized Criticality: An Explanation of 1/f 
Noise,” Physical Review Letters 59, no. 4 (July 27, 1987): 381.  
19 Per Bak and Maya Paczuski, “Complexity, Contingency, and Criticality,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 92 (July 1995): 6691.  
20 Bak and Paczuski, 6690. 
21 M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 148. 
22 John H. Holland, Emergence: From Chaos to Order (Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1998), 117. 
23 Holland, 117. 
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believed that developing computer-based models of complex adaptive systems was 
necessary to understanding the principles that governed their operation.24 His work, across 
a number of scholarly articles and books, has already suggested a number of such 
principles. Other academics have contributed to the understanding of complex adaptive 
systems. Roy Eidelson has examined both the basic functions of complex adaptive systems, 
as well as how they interact with both their environment and other complex adaptive 
systems.25 J. Barkley Rosser Jr. has written on how the concept of self-organized criticality 
specifically operates within complex adaptive systems.26  
Some researchers have already applied complex adaptive systems to law 
enforcement and related topics. Michael Agar utilized complexity and complex adaptive 
systems to organize his research into heroin trends.27 Agar found the complex adaptive 
systems framework useful as a mental model to explain various interactions between agents 
and to organize his research.28 In the United Kingdom, Richard Leary and Jenny Thomas 
have examined how complex adaptive systems could be used as a framework to examine 
criminal organizations and plan operations within the context of police intelligence.29 A 
lieutenant with the Massachusetts State Police, Robert Leverone, published a master’s 
thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School that looked at applying the complex adaptive 
systems framework to law enforcement’s control of tumultuous crowds.30  
 
24 John H. Holland, Hidden Order: How Adaption Builds Complexity (Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 
1995), 94. 
25 Roy Eidelson, “Complex Adaptive Systems in the Behavioral and Social Sciences,” Review of 
General Psychology 1, no. 1 (1997): 42–71. 
26 J. Barkley Rosser Jr., “On the Complexities of Complex Economic Dynamics,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 13, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 169–92. 
27 Michael Agar, “Complexity Theory: An Exploration and Overview Based on John Holland’s 
Work,” Field Methods 11, no. 2 (1999): 99–120. 
28 Agar, 103. 
29 Richard Leary and Jenny Thomas, “How Complexity Theory Is Changing the Role of Analysis in 
Law Enforcement and National Security,” in Intelligence Management, ed. Babak Akhgar and Simeon 
Yates (London: Springer, 2011).  
30 Robert Leverone, “Crowds as Complex Adaptive Systems: Strategic Implications for Law 
Enforcement” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/48549. 
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Complexity is not without critics; among the most prominent critics is science 
writer John Horgan. Horgan’s book, The End of Science, advances his thesis that no more 
fundamental “revelations or revolutions” are left for science to discover, and he criticizes 
the claims of several realms, including complexity, that monumental advances await 
discovery.31 Horgan has coined the neologism chaoplexity, combining chaos theory and 
complexity, as he believes that researchers have yet to devise truly distinctive separations 
between the two branches.32 He credits chaoplexity research with the creation of “potent 
metaphors” but believes that practical advancements will result merely in engineering, and 
theoreticians will keep playing in the realms of what he terms “ironic science.”33 
Ultimately, Horgan believes that complexity is self-refuting. Interviews with many of the 
leading researchers of complexity have led him to believe that they seek to develop a 
“unified theory” that can explain and predict the behavior of complex systems, despite the 
fundamental principles of complexity stating that such behavior cannot be perfectly 
predicted.34 
2. Networks and Netwar 
Social network analysis is a well-developed field that originated in sociology and 
has recently seen an influx of interest from physicists involved in the study of complexity. 
The particulars of how to perform social network analysis are beyond the scope of this 
work, but John Scott’s Social Network Analysis is an excellent introductory textbook that 
illustrates many of the central terms and techniques of social network analysis, written to 
be accessible by a novice to the field.35 For Scott, social network analysis is a “collection 
of theoretically informed methods” that “provides a vocabulary and set of measures for 
 
31 John Horgan, The End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientific 
Age (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 11, ProQuest. 
32 Horgan, 11. 
33 Horgan, 176. 
34 Horgan, 212–13. 
35 John Scott, Social Network Analysis, 4th ed. (London: SAGE Publications Inc., 2017). The second 
edition of this book is recommended as further reading on this subject in Six Degrees by Duncan Watts. 
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relational analysis” but it is not in itself a formal body of theory.36 While acknowledging 
that social network analysis has borrowed some concepts (at least metaphorically) from 
physics, Scott is ambivalent about the contributions of physicists like Duncan Watts and 
Albert-Laszlo Barbasi to the field. Scott admits the value of the theoretical work on small-
world networks, and the subsequent research into how networks change, performed by 
Watts, but he is more dismissive of Barabasi’s work and views it as a mathematical 
confirmation of previous findings by sociologists.37 Overall, Scott seems to think that 
much of the “discoveries” by physicists in social network analysis are not so much new 
discoveries as they are retreading ground already covered by sociologists of which the 
newcomers are unaware. 
The major contribution of Watts to the study of networks has been the discovery of 
the small-world network. Watts first published this discovery in the paper “Collective 
Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” which he wrote with his advisor, Steven 
Strogatz.38 He later followed that brief paper with the publication of his thesis as a book, 
Small Worlds.39 The small-world phenomenon is a state where one node on a graph can 
connect to any other via a relatively small number of intermediaries when most nodes are 
clustered together. Importantly, this phenomenon exists between order and randomness and 
requires only a small number of links between clusters because they have a non-linear 
effect.40 Both of these works, and a number of other articles published by Watts, are 
academic in tone, and require the reader to have some familiarity with advanced math to 
appreciate it fully.  
In contrast, Watts published a second book, Six Degrees: The Science of a 
Connected Age, which was written for a popular audience. In that book, Watts describes 
 
36 Scott, 8. 
37 Scott, 36–38, 160–61. 
38 Duncan J. Watts and Steven H. Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” 
Nature 393 (1998): 440–442. 
39 Duncan J. Watts, Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks between Order and Randomness 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
40 Watts and Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” 441. Known colloquially 
as the six degrees effect, as in “The Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon.” 
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the “science of networks,” which he claims has provided three major insights. First, the 
small-world phenomenon demonstrates that what appear to be quite large networks are 
more interconnected than they would first appear; second, these networks behave non-
linearly; and third, that multi-disciplinary cooperation will be required to bring the science 
of networks to maturity.41 Watts acknowledges the debt owed by physicists to sociologists 
in developing social network analysis, but he believes that the data driven approach of 
physics has reinvigorated the study of networks.42 Complexity theory is the substrate of 
this book, although Watts does not spend much time speaking of complexity per se. 
However, he does give a thumbnail sketch of the “complex systems” being mapped as 
networks as those whose dense interconnections lead to emergent behavior.43 
Similarly, Barabasi published a number of academic works describing his 
discovery of scale-free networks prior to a more mass-market book. Barabasi published the 
article “Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks” with Reka Albert in which they 
argued that scale free networks are generated through a self-organized process of 
preferential attachment, which leads to a relatively small number of highly connected nodes 
and much larger numbers of nodes with few connections.44 Publishing with Albert and 
Jeong, Barbasi demonstrated empirical evidence of the scale free network model by using 
a robot to chart links between web pages in “Diameter of the World Wide Web.”45 
Following on his academic work, Barabasi wrote for a lay audience in his book, Linked, 
which examined how complex systems permeate the modern world and how a study of 
networks and network dynamics can help make sense of such systems.46 
 
41 Duncan J. Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2003), 299–306. 
42 Watts, 28–29. 
43 Watts, 24–27. In the further reading suggested for this section of the book, Watts specifically 
directs the reader to Holland’s Emergence as one of a number of suggested texts on complex adaptive 
systems. 
44 Albert-Laszlo Barabasi and Reka Albert, “Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks,” Science 
286 (1999): 509.  
45 Reka Albert, Hawoong Jeong, and Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, “Diameter of the World-Wide Web,” 
Nature 401 (1999): 130.  
46 Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It 
Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life, 2014 ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 9–10. 
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In their popular works, both Watts and Barabasi illustrate the application of network 
thinking to a wide variety of subjects in the modern world. The philosopher Manuel 
Castells has engaged with similar material in an academically rigorous fashion in his three-
volume work, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. In the first volume of 
this work, The Rise of the Network Society, Castells sets out his thesis that networks are 
rising as the fundamental force of social organization, which leads to what he calls 
alternatively network society or informational society.47 Castells describes an Information 
Technology (IT) Revolution of modern computing and communications devices that 
achieved a self-sustaining feedback loop that increased their abilities, reach, and 
importance to society.48 Castells believes that society is defined by the relationships of 
production, experience, and power and his three-volume work examines how those 
relationships are being altered in the transition to an informational society.49 
Castells spends much of the first volume examining how the network society is 
impacting and driving the global economy from a loosely connected industrial economy to 
a tightly linked informational one.50 Next, he branches into more esoteric considerations 
of how perceptions of both time and space are being redefined by network processes. He 
develops the concept of “the space of flows,” or how areas dominated by these new 
networks reshape themselves towards a converging homogeneity despite being physically 
separated by great distances.51 These areas stand in contrast to those areas still dominated 
by “the space of places,” or those whose cultural expression is largely self-referential and 
not dependent on the interchange of information throughout a global network.52 His 
conception of “timeless time” refers to the effect electronic media has on the perception 
 
47 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed. vol. 1, The Information Age: Economy, 
Society, and Culture (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 21. See footnote 31 for additional details. 
In general, Castells uses network society when describing the organization of society and informational 
when describing the nature of society. 
48 Castells, 5–6, 31–32. 
49 Castells, 14. 
50 Castells, ch, 2–4. 
51 Castells, 442–48. 
52 Castells, 453–59. 
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and ability to perceive differentiation of time and sequence in the network society, which 
“is a culture at the same time of the eternal and of the ephemeral.”53 Castells observes that 
the network society is not distributed evenly, nor do all members of society benefit. He 
warns, “our societies are increasingly structured around a bipolar opposition between the 
Net and the self.”54 In other words, a paradoxical rise is occurring in both the primacy of 
networks with its attendant interconnectedness and exclusionary identities at the dawn of 
the informational society, and it is likely to be the cause of much friction and conflict in 
the years ahead.55 
The trilogy is a massive and comprehensive work. The first volume deals with the 
underlying logic of the structure of this new society, while the second and third volumes 
examine how various elements of the world are reacting to the Information Age. In addition 
to his analysis of the impact of the Information Age, this work is influential in that many 
who write on similar topics are forced to react to it (either positively or negatively), as 
reflected by a number of the scholars referenced for this thesis. Arquilla and Ronfeldt agree 
with Castells that the increase in the prevalence of networks as an organizational form is 
salient for addressing strategic and social issues in the coming decades.56 Morcol and 
Wachhaus attribute the interest in the influence of networks in public policy to the 
recognition of Castells’s ideas.57 Scott, on the other hand, does not endorse him. Scott 
recognizes that Castells has popularized the network society but argues against his 
dismissal of social network analysis as a useful tool for analyzing networks.58  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt are national security analysts who have studied and published 
on the changing nature of conflict in the Information Age. Their article “Cyberwar is 
 
53 Castells, 492. 
54 Castells, 3. 
55 Castells, 21–25. 
56 David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, “What Next for Networks and Netwars?,” in Networks and 
Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 321–322. 
57 Goktug Morcol and Aaron Wachhaus, “Network and Complexity Theories: A Comparison and 
Prospects for a Synthesis,” Administrative Theory and Praxis 31, no. 1 (March 2009): 44. 
58 Scott, Social Network Analysis, 7–8. 
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Coming!” introduced their concepts of cyberwar and netwar in 1993.59 Both concepts 
examined how information would become a central axis of both conflict and organization, 
with cyberwar as an explicitly military doctrine and netwar as a broader category of 
conflicts involving both state and non-state actors.60 Netwar is an extended digression in 
this article and is mostly focused on actors utilizing new (at the time) communication 
technologies. 
In 1996, David Ronfeldt published, “Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks: A 
Framework about Societal Evolution,” which laid out much of the theoretical background 
on the effect of the Information Age on society which informs the theory of netwar.61 
Ronfeldt posits that advances in IT have sufficiently empowered the network as an 
organizational form to become the primary focus of ordering Information Age societies.62 
Unlike Castells, who focuses on looking forward, Ronfeldt fits the network into a 
framework with three other organizing principles for society (the titular Tribes, Institutions, 
and Markets) and briefly sketches how human societies evolve by incorporating each form 
in sequence that reaches the apogee in a “T+I+M+N” society that has incorporated all four 
forms.63 In addressing the implications of the rise of network organizations for societal 
conflict, Ronfeldt briefly describes netwar and directs readers to a book length discussion 
of the topic.64 
Also published in 1996, Arquilla and Ronfeldt devoted a book to detailing netwar 
in The Advent of Netwar.65 In elaborating on the particulars of netwar actors, they stressed 
that the primary identifier was a networked form of organization, and not just the methods 
 
59 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for 
Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 23–60. Republished in this volume, 
with the original citation given in the text. 
60 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 28–30. 
61 David Ronfeldt, Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks: A Framework about Societal Evolution 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). 
62 Ronfeldt, 11–12. 
63 Ronfeldt, 3. 
64 Ronfeldt, 35. 
65 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). 
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of communication they use.66 In contrast to the detailed analyses of network structures and 
dynamics found in Scott, Watts, and Barabasi, Arquilla and Ronfeldt limit their network 
forms to three main archetypes: “stars,” which are a kind of hub and spoke, straightforward 
chains, and “all channel” designs where every node is linked to all the others in the 
network.67 They identify four main levels of analyses to assess the effectiveness of a 
network organization in waging netwar: organizational, doctrinal, technological, and 
social.68 
In 1997, Arquilla and Ronfeldt edited In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in 
the Information Age. In this volume, a number of authors contributed chapters about the 
role of information theory, philosophy, and systems in the future of national security 
strategy for the United States. Arquilla and Ronfeldt contribute the concluding chapter, 
“Looking Ahead: Preparing for Information-Age Conflict,” which elaborates on their 
interest in the role of information in conflict.69 Although they do not mention netwar 
specifically, they introduce the tactic of “swarming,” which they note is most effectively 
wielded by networked adversaries who have robust communication links.70 This concept 
is the subject of their 2000 book, Swarming & the Future of Conflict.71 They elaborate on 
the doctrine of swarming as a continual engagement by small units at times and places of 
their choosing to confound and damage a larger, often clumsier foe.72 This book primarily 
deals with swarming as a tactic in the military end of the spectrum of conflict; however, 
 
66 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, vii. 
67 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, vii. They allow for hybrid designs in their text, but do not analyze any 
differences such designs would introduce. 
68 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 51–52. 
69 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Looking Ahead: Preparing for Information-Age Conflict,” in In 
Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 439–
501. 
70 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 465, 468. 
71 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2000), https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311.html. 
72 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, vii–viii. 
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they do provide examples of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) swarming in social 
activism and raise the possibility of economic and media swarming tactics as well.73 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt returned to a specific treatment on netwar in their 2001 
volume Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terrorism, Crime, and Militancy. This book 
is an edited volume, with Arquilla and Ronfeldt contributing the introductory and 
concluding chapters, and a variety of authors examining aspects and manifestations of 
netwar. “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)” is their introductory chapter, and provides an 
updated introduction and summary to their theory.74 Beyond explaining the mechanics of 
networked conflict, Arquilla and Ronfeldt begin dividing observed netwars between 
globalist and autonomist in outlook, and placing netwars waged by criminal and terrorist 
concerns in the autonomist category.75 The authors are aware of Castells’s work, and this 
categorization of netwars mirrors the dynamic he noted of tension between interconnection 
and relative autonomy. The concluding chapter, “What Next for Networks and Netwars,” 
looks at various ways the study of netwar may be advanced and how states may adapt to 
this environment.76 Most importantly, they now add a fifth level of analysis, narrative, to 
the four levels they had identified in their earlier work.77 This narrative level is about 
shaping which interpretive framework will be the dominant one when a given conflict is 
considered in the popular imagination.78 This new emphasis on narrative reflects the 
increasing dominance of the network society, as the body of literature on netwar has 
evolved. At the dawn of the network society, the theory only accounted for using networks 
as an organizational tool; in maturity, the theory recognizes that networked actors are 
embedded in an even greater societal network, and must therefore, also spread a “story” 
through the network to achieve societal legitimacy. 
 
73 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 5. See also Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s first footnote in the text. 
74 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited).” 
75 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 16–19. They admit to an intermediary “mixed” category as well. 
76 Ronfeldt and Arquilla, “What Next for Networks and Netwars?,” 311–361. 
77 Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 324. 
78 Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 328–333. 
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3. Summary 
A serious inquiry into the literature on complexity and complex adaptive systems 
almost inevitably leads into literature on network theory. Networks are a natural metaphor 
for the highly interconnected agents of a complex adaptive system, and many researchers 
(such as Watts and Barabasi) are finding complexity dynamics at work in sufficiently 
interconnected networks. Both camps of literature are divided between works written for a 
general audience and highly technical literature that requires some skill in mathematics to 
follow. It is valuable to examine both kinds of literature; the works written for the general 
audience are excellent for overviews of the related concepts and vocabulary, while the 
technical literature demonstrates that substance does underlay the high-level theorizing. As 
a whole, the literature reviewed assisted with answering the research question by providing 
an in-depth understanding theoretical concepts needed to understand the changes in society 
that require a complexity-based model of policing. Additionally, the literature reviewed 
provided an understanding with how complex systems and networks behave, which 
provided the ability to recognize similar dynamics in real-world situations and in 
envisioning future operations of complexity-based policing.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis utilizes qualitative analysis to examine existing law enforcement 
practices and research. Leedy and Ormrod note that qualitative analysis is well suited to 
both exploratory research and research that “can reveal the complex, possibly multilayered 
nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships, systems, or people.”79 As 
noted previously, the very essence of complexity theory is found in the examination of the 
relationships and interactions between elements in a system, so qualitative research is well 
suited to the subject matter. The primary method of research is to employ content analysis 
to examine existing scholarly research about law enforcement, draw out the elements 
within it consistent with complexity theory, and explore how those various elements may 
be assembled into a cohesive whole.  
 
79 Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design, 12th ed. (New 
York: Pearson, 2019), 230. 
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A major element of the methodology behind selecting research for this thesis is the 
author’s position as a working police officer. This experience as a law enforcement 
practitioner drove an interest in addressing the author’s own perceptions of shortcomings 
in the standard model of policing to deal with crime and social challenges to law 
enforcement in the present day. The selection of a street robbery pattern in Washington, 
DC, came from the author’s dual role as both a scholar and practitioner. In his role as 
middle management in the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, DC (MPDC), 
the author was responsible for implementing the prescribed response to the robbery 
problem; yet as a scholar, the author believed that the standard methods employed to 
analyze, understand, and respond to crime patterns were insufficient. The author has striven 
not to allow his role as a practitioner to do more than guide his research, and has made 
every endeavor to support the arguments found in this thesis rigorously with substantial 
academic research. 
The author was first introduced to complexity theory in Stanley McChrystal’s book 
Team of Teams, which presented the topic for a general audience.80 Upon deciding to 
investigate the potential of using complexity theory as the basis for a model of policing, 
academic literature on complexity was sought out, which quickly led the author to seek out 
literature on networks. Relatively few sources are available regarding law enforcement and 
complexity, and none was discovered that dealt with a truly fundamental rethinking and 
restructuring of law enforcement based upon complexity theory. Thus, it was necessary to 
explore existing research and extend it into new theoretical grounds. 
This thesis goes about this extension by first establishing a grounding in both 
complexity and network theories. From there, existing frameworks, such as complex 
adaptive systems, the TIMN framework, and the netwar doctrine were identified as useful 
tools for both interpreting and putting into practice the theoretical concepts previously 
identified. With that grounding in place, the existing practice of law enforcement (in the 
form of a case study and analysis of various models of policing) was examined for 
 
80 Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New 
York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015). 
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congruence with the theories and frameworks identified previously. That examination 
resulted in the identification of a number of common themes and elements, which have 
been identified and presented as the answer to the research question posed at the beginning 
of the thesis. 
E. ROADMAP 
This thesis begins by establishing an understanding of two major theoretical blocks, 
which will subsequently be applied to policing and law enforcement. Chapter II provides 
an overview of complexity theory and complex adaptive systems. Chapter III examines 
modern network theory and its relation to complexity theory, as well as how networks and 
the Information Revolution are increasingly dominating societal organization and conflict. 
Chapter IV examines crime as a complex adaptive system and finds that street robberies in 
Washington, DC, exhibit hallmarks of complexity. Chapter V examines several 
alternatives to standard, reactive policing through the lens of complexity and network 
theories in an attempt to provide a useful synthesis of different alternatives. Chapter VI 
addresses how police leadership can utilize the Cynefin framework to make sense of 
complex environments until a complex epistemology is fully articulated. Finally, Chapter 
VII concludes the thesis with a number of recommendations for implementing a 
complexity-based model of policing, as well as a brief discussion of avenues for further 
research. 
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II. COMPLEXITY THEORY 
How people understand or think about a problem greatly influences the ways that 
they try to solve it. The discovery of rigid physical laws that govern the universe and the 
ability to reduce complicated phenomena to more simple problems that yield to 
mathematical analysis has led to powerful advances in science and technology. For many 
people, the belief that all problems can be broken down and statistically analyzed is the 
default worldview adopted when seeking to solve a problem. Complexity theory, on the 
other hand, is the study of problems that must be appreciated as a whole. The relationships 
between the parts of a complex problem are so important that attempts to reduce it to more 
simple terms do not yield meaningful results. Studies of complex problems and complex 
systems call for changes in perspectives and new tools and approaches. This chapter 
presents a brief overview of complexity theory and examines a particular type of complex 
system that of the complex adaptive system, which is composed of densely connected 
agents who can change in response to stimuli. 
A. LINEAR THINKING 
Investigations of complexity usually begin by sorting problems into different 
domains and classifying each domain by similar characteristics exhibited by problems or 
systems of that type. In the seminal work of complexity theory, Weaver sorted problems 
into three domains: those of simplicity, disorganized complexity, and organized 
complexity.81 As research into Weaver’s “organized complexity” has advanced since 
1948, additional classification schemes have been proposed to consider new discoveries. 
David Snowden, one of the principal developers of the Cynefin framework (Figure 1), sorts 
problems into five domains. The domains of simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic 
surround the domain of disorder.82 
 
81 Weaver, “Science and Complexity,” 540. 
82 David Snowden and Mary Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review, November 2007, 72. Snowden has modified the terminology over time, and the most 
recent versions of the framework have replaced “simple” with “clear.” This term is alliteratively pleasing 
and fits well with Snowden’s focus on decision making. The author has decided to retain the earlier 
terminology in this chapter, as it fits better with a discussion of types of problems. 
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Figure 1. The Cynefin Framework.83 
The concept of linearity is often set forth as the boundary between simple and 
complicated problems on one side and complex problems on the other. Linearity was 
originally defined in mathematical terms, but its definition has been extended as the study 
of complexity has been embraced by many disciplines.84 Linear problems can be thought 
of as having three main qualities. First, they react in fixed proportions to various inputs. 
Secondly, they are constructed out of independent variables that only affect a limited set 
of known, dependent variables. Thirdly, a linear problem can be understood through 
reductionist thinking, or breaking it down into small individual parts and tallying the 
interactions of those atomized parts. Linear problems can be thought of as a strict math 
equation; the sum of the variables completely describes the problem.85 
Simple problems are those like Isaac Newton’s “clockwork universe,” where 
problems can be reduced in scope, and their position fixed in a system governed by rules. 
Once those rules have been deduced and sufficient observations of the elements in the 
system made, all possible outcomes can be determined.86 Simple problems are stable, with 
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knowable relationships of cause and effect that yield a single best answer.87 Simple 
problems should not be dismissed, just because they are conceptually easier to solve. In 
Science and Complexity, Weaver noted that the science of simple problems had yielded 
advancements, such as the internal combustion engine, flight, and telecommunications.88 
Simple problems are generally concerned with just a handful of variables, while 
complicated problems greatly increase the number of variables involved. Despite the great 
increase in the number of elements that must be accounted for in a complicated problem, 
it is still linear because each variable is only linked to a handful of others in known and 
fixed ways.89 Weaver noted that while it was impractical or impossible to determine the 
exact value for each variable in such a problem, the overall orderliness of the system could 
accurately be described in terms of average behavior by using statistical mechanics.90 
Although complicated problems often call for expert knowledge to comprehend the causes 
and effects between the variables, clear answers can still be found.91 Since the interactions 
between the different elements, numerous as they may be, are limited and fixed, 
complicated problems are still susceptible to reductionism. 
Pycroft offers the example of the Apollo 13 space capsule as an example of a 
complicated problem. After an in-flight emergency occurred during a mission to the moon, 
an unanticipated mechanical process had to be devised to return the capsule and astronauts 
safely to the Earth. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) personnel, 
working with technical readouts and models of the spacecraft, were able to solve the 
problem successfully by figuring out how to get the spacecraft to perform the operation. 
Although composed of a dizzying number of individual pieces, those pieces still interacted 
in a limited, mechanical fashion.92 
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Elizabeth Jayanti noted that linear epistemology dominates inquiry into the social 
sciences, and that academic discussions focused on the function of linear epistemology 
instead of methodically describing its characteristics.93 She asserts that this worldview is 
so pervasive that “linear, Newtonian assumptions underlie many HRD [human resources 
development] models, including those which are superficially systematic, cyclical, or 
nonlinear.”94 She identifies seven key assumptions that form the basis of a linear 
epistemology: 
1. Closed models are adequate for modeling processes occurring in open 
systems 
2. Models can be universally applied and do not need to specify where and 
when they should be used 
3. A system is equal to the sum of its parts 
4. Time is reversible 
5. Causality is linear 
6. Future outcomes—like the future itself—can be predicted 
7. That environments are relatively static and tend toward equilibrium95 
Most of Jayanti’s propositions are self-explanatory, but the fifth and seventh 
assumptions bear elaboration. By positing that under linear thought time is reversible, 
Jayanti means that anyone can work backwards, either mathematically or by assuming a 
desired end state of a process and then reverse engineering the steps to get there.96 Bak 
and Paczuski describe linear equilibrium as the idea that when a system exists in such an 
equilibrium, small changes will cause only small changes.97 
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This epistemology functions well when devising solutions to problems that involve 
simple and complicated systems. In applying the Cynefin framework as a problem-solving 
tool, Snowden states that the simple domain is the area in which best practices are applied, 
functions are automated, and command and control hierarchies are well suited.98 While 
the complicated domain often requires detailed or expert knowledge, it is generally 
characterized by stable relationships; therefore, Snowden asserts that it too can be reduced 
and solved piece-meal if someone is willing to invest the effort.99 Kurtz and Snowden note 
that the complicated domain is “the domain of systems thinking, the learning organization, 
and the adaptive enterprise, all of which are too often confused with complexity theory.”100 
Clearly then, a detailed knowledge of complexity is needed to differentiate it from linear 
thinking.  
B. COMPLEXITY THEORY AND COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
Complexity theory is the emerging interdisciplinary, academic study of complex 
problems. Complexity does not have a definitive formal definition, but it is generally seen 
as a new type of analysis that builds on previous work done in cybernetics, catastrophe 
theory, and chaos theory.101 As such, complexity sometimes causes confusion, as it has 
technical meanings in other fields and is commonly used in a metaphorical sense.102 As 
generally used within complexity theory, complexity describes nonlinear dynamic 
systems.103 
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As they involve nonlinear systems, the most prominent feature of complex 
problems is that they do not react proportionately or predictably.104 Exact predictions 
about the behavior of complex systems cannot be made because so many circumstances 
and interactions are occurring that obtaining sufficient knowledge about them to make 
accurate predictions is impossible.105 Variables in complex problems continuously link to 
each other in ways that can overlap that then are not fixed. They can “link and let go and 
link again,” and therefore, cannot be neatly classified into categories of independent and 
dependent.106 Finally, complex problems do not yield to reductionist thinking because they 
feature emergent properties. Emergence is when a larger whole possesses general features 
or properties not found within the individual parts of that whole. These emergent properties 
are not simply recreating the properties of the constituent parts at scale.107 As linear 
problems were earlier likened to strict mathematical sums, complex problems are noted for 
being more than the sum of their parts. 
Complex problems and systems are dynamic instead of fixed. Complex systems are 
marked by organizing themselves into something “interesting” between the realms of 
absolute chaos and absolute order.108 Complex systems fluctuate between states of 
stability and instability, due to the shifting relationships of the elements within them and 
the emergent properties generated by their interactions.109 Weaver described this state as 
“organized complexity” and stated that because of these properties, statistical 
measurements of average behavior does not give meaningful solutions to problems in this 
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space.110 Moreover, because a complex system is continually fluctuating, it must be 
appreciated as a whole. Unlike simple and complicated systems, mapping out the state of 
a complex system at any single point in time does not indicate a limited set of past and 
future states.111 
The framework of complex adaptive systems (CAS) has been developed to model 
complexity theory in action. As with much of complexity theory, no single authoritative 
definition of this term is available, but wide similarities exist between the definitions used 
by practitioners in the field. One of the simplest definitions utilized by researchers at the 
Santa Fe Institute is a system that retains “coherence under change.”112 John Holland, who 
was one of the foremost of those researchers, defined CAS as “systems composed of 
interacting agents described in terms of rules. These agents adapt by changing their rules 
as experience accumulates. In cas … a portion of any agent’s efforts at adaptation is spent 
adapting to other adapting agents.”113 Eidelson gives a general definition of CAS as “a 
large collection of diverse parts interconnected in a hierarchical manner such that 
organization persists or grows over time without centralized control.”114 Although none 
of these definitions individually completely describe the concept of CAS, when taken 
together, they highlight the majority of the salient features of a CAS. 
When describing CAS, the term system is used to indicate a collection of individual 
agents linked or connected in some fashion. These links make the system complex, and can 
interlink it with even larger scale complex systems.115 Economist Herb Simon described 
this interlocking of systems as “hierarchy.”116 Complexity arises out of the interactions of 
large numbers of agents, and Simon asserted that hierarchy was necessary for complexity 
because “stable intermediate forms” would lead to a faster development of complex 
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behavior than pure randomness would.117 He described these subsystems as being formed 
by elements joined by strong bonds interacting together, and then being linked to other 
subsystems through weaker bonds to form a larger whole.118 One way to think of it is to 
examine a person from a systems view; a human being is a “system of systems” while at 
the same time being a subsystem enmeshed in another system of systems called society.119 
When the agents of a CAS are human beings, the linkages can become extremely complex, 
as humans are capable of belonging to several different systems at once.120  
John Holland pioneered the field of agent-based modeling. He observed that 
complex phenomena (in a variety of contexts) could be modeled as a system of interacting 
agents, whose accumulated interactions displayed emergent behavior.121 His work on 
agent-based modeling has set the foundation for much of today’s current understanding of 
CAS, as it was his belief that developing computer-based models would be necessary to 
govern their operation.122 As Holland was working within the context of computer 
programs, much of his modeling is very mechanical. He noted that at the early stages of 
investigating CAS, it was necessary to limit detailed modeling to systems with well-
understood laws that could be reduced to mathematical description, but that emergence 
occurred in political/philosophical systems as well.123 
The linked agents in a CAS operate independently and are constantly gathering 
information from their interactions with the environment and other agents. The agents 
individually respond to stimuli within the environment, and competition between agents 
winnows out losing responses.124 This competition occurs through a form of problem 
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solving, with agents reacting to feedback and developing heuristics.125 Conceptually, 
agents are individually modeled, with direct and indirect interactions with other agents 
affecting their behavior, and the system defined up from the individual agents rather than 
attempting to populate it with agents fitted to a template from a top-level view of the 
system.126  
The CAS as a whole is adaptive through emergent behavior, with changes 
originating from the agents and propagating throughout the system, rather than being 
imposed from above. Agents within a CAS must gather and act on information and will 
each individually introduce various strategies or behaviors. A selection process will occur 
as some of those various alternatives work better than others do, which leads to an 
amplification of successful options, as agents seek to increase success and reduce failure. 
This process of variation, selection, and amplification played out across all the agents in 
the CAS allows the system as a whole to adapt continually and emergently to changing 
circumstances.127 
When seeking to model the process of emergence, it has been useful to develop a 
simple set of rules that will inform the behavior of each agent.128 The rules governing each 
agent can encompass possibilities for several conditions or actions, and rules are in 
competition with each other, as agents can adopt or discard rules in the process of adapting 
to seek advantage. Each rule and agent is linked to, acted on, and influenced by others in 
the network, which prevents meaningful understanding of the entire system from 
examining any individual agent.129 As the elements of the system constantly interact, new 
strategies form iteratively, which prevents the system from settling into equilibrium.130 
Rafe Sagarin explains that this mode of learning from repeated activity is characterized by 
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scholar Michael Kenney as metis and is the key learning mode to success in arenas 
characterized by constant change.131 
Information generated by the environment and the interactions of various agents in 
the system must propagate throughout the system. Holland identified “tagging” as a 
mechanism that allows agents to make distinctions among other agents and environmental 
elements and categorize the information they have gathered.132 Tags provide the 
mechanism for the “rules” that govern each agent’s behavior, as the agents take action in 
regards to the tags they display.133 Additionally, tags govern the movement of something 
(either physically or intellectually) through a CAS, as agents learn from encounters and 
seek to interact with other agents with favorable tags.134 When human beings are the agents 
in a CAS, they are capable of using various media to spread information nonlinearly, as 
communications technology allows agents to transcend their environment and transmit 
information to recipients who are unknown to them.135 All these processes cause the CAS 
to grow and self-organize to a critical point sometimes described as “the edge of chaos.”136 
This concept was defined by the work of physicist Per Bak, who investigated the 
concept of self-organized criticality; the tendency of large, dynamic, and interconnected 
systems to evolve towards a critical state where linear behavior is abandoned.137 Bak’s 
work argued, “dynamical systems with extended spatial degrees of freedom naturally 
evolve into self-organized critical structures of states which are barely stable.”138 Bak’s 
initial experiment of adding sand, one grain at a time, to a pile has since become the 
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standard metaphor to explain this concept. Initially the sand is in a state of pure order, or 
general equilibrium, being literally flat.139 At some point, the pile will reach a point of 
pure chaos (meaning disorder), as it collapses in a massive avalanche. As the pile grows, 
each grain of sand becomes connected in a lattice to the other grains of sand in the pile.140 
As sand is continually added, eventually the pile will organize itself into a critical state as 
the number of connections between each grain of sand increases. Once it becomes critical, 
the pile becomes non-linear in the sense that adding a single grain of sand may have no 
effect, start a small- or medium-sized avalanche, or start the giant avalanche that causes 
the pile to collapse.141  
Therefore, the growth of a CAS is limited. Three main factors limit its growth. First, 
every connection in the system increases the distance that information must travel, and at 
some point, the distance becomes too far, and the system collapses into chaos.142 Second, 
agents must accumulate sufficient resources to offset the additional complexity introduced 
by adding new connections. If the additional complexity accrued does not result in 
sufficient benefits to the agents, growth will not continue to propagate throughout the 
system.143 Third, networks that have formed feedback loops that are too dense can fire too 
fast, which causes an “epileptic fit” in which the network no longer responds to external 
stimuli.144 
On the other hand, research has suggested that the edge of chaos is not just a 
limitation on CAS, but may actually be an advantage. Self-organized criticality is thought 
to be where resilience, or the ability of a system to “maintain functions in the face of 
stresses and change,” is located.145 The edge of chaos offers the opportunity not just for a 
system to persist, but also thrive. Eidelson offers the analogy of a virus existing at the edge 
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of chaos; the virus must balance between stagnating and therefore succumbing to the host’s 
immune response or self-destruction at the hands of unchecked mutation.146 The edge of 
chaos is the state in which the system has evolved enough linkages that it has transcended 
order to complexity. It now behaves non-linearly and emergent features allow it to respond 
and adapt to change. In this “goldilocks zone” of complexity, the system is flexible enough 
not to shatter when challenged as a rigidly ordered system would.147 Yet, it also retains 
enough coherence not to collapse into disorganized randomness, as systems, which become 
completely unstructured do.  
C. OBJECTIONS TO COMPLEXITY 
Complexity theory is not without its critics and even some advocates point out some 
shortcomings. Rosser notes that it is difficult to conduct empirical tests of complex 
phenomena and that most applications of complexity theory validate themselves based on 
explaining situations that have already occurred, rather than predicting the future.148 
Professor Ralph Stacey views CAS as an analogy for understanding human actions and 
warns against some of the dangers of developing models. He states that modeling requires 
an “external modeler” and both an initial design of the system and a conceptual completion 
of the system. In reality, no outside force is sculpting a beginning to a CAS; rather, it has 
evolved over time through the actions of the agents who compose it. The CAS does not 
work towards a modeled end state, but it is continually generated and evolving through 
feedback and iterative behavior.149 Levy notes that focusing on modeling complexity runs 
the risk of going down a rabbit hole; the development of more complex models may not 
lead to a profitable increase in predictive power.150 
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Perhaps the most vigorous critic of complexity is science writer John Horgan. 
Horgan believes that humanity has reached the end of science; a state where knowledge 
will advance, but no fundamental “revelations or revolutions” are left to be discovered and 
where scientists employ hyperbole to puff up the importance of what are relatively modest 
insights.151 He has derisively coined the neologism “chaoplexity” because he contends that 
the definitions of chaos and complexity are not truly distinct.152 Horgan further contends 
that some of the key insights of complexity are repackaged knowledge. He offers the 
example that emergence would not be foreign to Darwin, whose theory of evolution was 
not Newtonian.153 Ultimately, he posits that the end result of “chaoplexity” has been the 
creation of “potent metaphors” rather than any true advances.154 
These objections are not persuasive against applying complexity as a way of 
examining the behavior of social systems. Agar notes that it is true that outside of the 
physical sciences, complexity is used metaphorically, but that it is a useful metaphor 
because it suggests questions to ask and how answers to those questions may be 
organized.155 Holland argues that metaphors serve a function similar to scientific models 
by charting a relation between a source and a target that yields new insight.156 Ultimately, 
metaphors are powerful tools that human beings can apply to their thinking about the world. 
When it comes to human behavior, exact mathematical descriptions and predictions remain 
elusive. Complexity may yet provide a way to provide such an exacting mathematical 
analysis of highly interconnected social systems. However, even if it cannot, it provides a 
useful set of tools to recognize a new class of problems, organize thinking about such 
problems, and guide reactions to them. 
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III. NETWORKS AND NETWARS 
Recent advancements in complexity have focused on applying complexity theory 
to networks. Although some theorists working with networks see them as a separate 
discipline from complex systems, networks have a history of being used to illustrate 
abstract principles of complexity. Knowledge about one field does help to understand the 
other, and recently, some complexity theorists have begun to put forth the idea that both 
fields are really part of one integrated whole. In his book on applying complexity theory to 
international aid, Ben Ramalingam calls network analysis the “killer-app of complexity 
science.”157 This chapter begins with an examination of how physicists studying 
complexity have contributed to a new network theory, how networks are impacting and 
reordering society, and closes with a theory of networked conflict in the Information Age. 
Throughout these sections, the connections and contributions of complexity theory to 
people’s understandings of network dynamics is highlighted. 
A. NETWORKS AND COMPLEXITY 
Given a general understanding of complexity as being concerned with the 
interactions of a system of densely connected and adaptive agents, the network has long 
been a useful mental model to think about complexity. More recently, a modern take on 
network theory has arisen that indicates that network models and dynamics are an excellent 
tool to study and model complex interactions and systems. Many of those who investigate 
complexity across a variety of disciplines are discovering that the two fields are closely 
linked and that “at the heart of many—if not most—problems of organized complexity are 
network problems.”158 The physicist Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, himself responsible for a key 
discovery in modern network theory, goes a step further in establishing the link between 
complexity and networks, “One thing is increasingly clear: no theory of the cell, of social 
media or of the Internet can ignore the profound network effects that their 
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interconnectedness cause. Therefore, if we are ever to have a theory of complexity, it will 
sit on the shoulders of network theory.”159 
Modern network theory weaves together three different strands of scientific and 
academic inquiry into an integrated approach: sociology (specifically social network 
analysis), graph theory, and complexity theory. Prior to the work of the sociologist Jacob 
Moreno in the 1930s, sociologists had used terms like fabric and web metaphorically when 
studying society and social interactions. Moreno created the sociogram, which was the first 
attempt to diagram these relationships physically by representing people as points and 
relationships as lines connecting the points.160 Prior to the work of George Homans in the 
1940s, sociograms were generally used to map out the relations between a small group of 
people. Interactions between larger groups were recorded onto matrices, with the results 
often appearing to have a random distribution. Homans synthesized these techniques by 
rearranging the order of rows and columns in such matrices until they visually represented 
significant patterns in the data, such as the existence of one or more cliques (small groups 
that could then be mapped with a sociogram).161 
Researchers made and analyzed sociograms and the sociometric matrices 
individually. Homans had to perform the reorganization of each sociometric matrix by hand 
in an attempt to sift out notable patterns. In 1956, Cartwright and Harary introduced an 
analysis of social networks using the principles of graph theory to analyze the underlying 
structure and patterns of relationships mathematically between each person.162 Graph 
theory is a branch of mathematics borne from the work of Leonhard Euler when he solved 
the Konigsberg Bridge problem in 1736. The city consisted of four areas of land joined by 
seven bridges, and the problem asked if it was possible to cross all of the bridges of the 
city without using a bridge more than once. Euler solved the problem by abstracting the 
four land areas as four nodes and representing each bridge as a line connecting two 
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particular nodes. What Euler eventually determined was that it was not possible to solve 
the problem, because more than two nodes existed with an odd number of links present on 
the graph.163 What was more important than the actual solution to the problem was the 
method by which Euler solved it by abstracting the physical map of the city onto a simple 
graph and analyzing the properties of its elements to determine what solutions were 
possible.164 
Additional mathematicians built upon Euler’s insight and developed graph theory. 
Graph theory is a branch of math utilizing matrix algebra to describe relations among nodes 
precisely. Unlike more familiar graphs, the graphs generated are merely useful 
visualizations of underlying properties and their form and shape is not important.165 
However, while the visual layout of the graph is unimportant, graph theory provides a 
framework to define and measure the direction and weight of relationships, as well as 
concepts like degree (the number of connections a point has with other points) and 
centrality (a measure of relative connectedness within a network, as measured by 
degree).166 Graph theory provided a mathematical language to describe the structure of a 
network and analyze the effect of that structure on the behavior of the network itself. 
Modern social network analysis came into existence when a group of Harvard sociologists 
led by Harrison White used graph theory to begin modeling the structure of all kinds of 
social interactions and analyzing the impact of those structures on the interactions.167 
Beginning in the late 1990s, a number of physicists took an interest in networks as 
tools to model various complex systems. Duncan Watts was trying to analyze how a group 
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of crickets come to synchronize their chirping in the absence of any central control when 
he had the idea of viewing the crickets as a kind of network.168 His subsequent 
investigations into network structure mathematically proved that many real-world 
networks are of a type known as “small world networks,” a phenomenon popularly known 
as “six degrees of separation.” This concept evolved from the popularization of an 
experiment conducted by the psychologist Stanley Milgram in the 1970s that demonstrated 
the average number of links in a chain letter mailed from the Midwest to Boston was six.169 
Watts discovered that the structure of many real-world networks was responsible for this 
phenomenon. The networks existed between order and randomness; they were relatively 
tightly clustered into small, interconnected groups but a small number of random links 
between these groups had a non-linear effect on the structure of the network such that any 
two nodes could be linked through a small number of intermediaries.170 Watts further 
developed his work on small-world networks by studying the effects of dynamic systems 
that functioned as such networks and observed that they generated emergent 
phenomena.171 
The other major advancement was the discovery of “scale free networks” by 
Barabasi. These types of networks are characterized by having a few highly connected 
“hubs” and many more nodes that have only a handful of connections.172 It is called scale 
free because the average number of connections does not increase along a bell curve as the 
network grows, but instead keeps the same structure, following a power law distribution, 
even as more nodes and connections are added.173 Barabasi demonstrated the existence of 
this model by mapping the connections between pages on the internet and found that the 
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distribution of links followed a power law.174 The verification of scale free networks in 
real world settings has offered mathematical proof of complexity, as research has found 
them to be self-organized and capable of demonstrating emergent behaviors.175 
Although researchers like Watts and Barabasi are using network analysis in a 
formal sense to study complexity, there has long been at least a metaphorical link between 
the two fields. In his 1962 paper, “The Architecture of Complexity,” Simon examined how 
complex systems often consist of a system-of-systems. When examining this dynamic in 
complex social systems, Simon proposes the identification of these various systems by 
measuring the frequency of interactions in a sociometric matrix.176 In the same paper, 
Simon posits that each sub-system in a complex system is strongly bound among its 
components and connected to other sub-systems through weaker bonds.177 This concept 
prefigures the discovery by Granovetter in 1974 that weak network ties spread information 
further throughout a network than strong ties.178 Complexity researcher John Holland used 
neural nets as an example of a network that generates complex behavior through the 
interactions of the nodes of the network.179 Holland also described “flows” as one of the 
seven basic elements of CAS and explicitly used the language of networks and network 
properties to explain this concept.180 
Now, however, a number of complexity researchers are looking to synthesize 
modern network theory explicitly with complexity, as each can address gaps in the other. 
It is believed that one of the main advantages complexity offers to networks is an 
explanation for change over time. Watts identified that “in the past, networks have been 
viewed as objects of pure structure whose properties are fixed in time.”181 Much of his 
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work has focused on modeling networks as dynamic structures in two senses; first, every 
element represented as a node actually does something, and second, that each link 
represents an interaction, which causes some kind of change as time passes.182 Examining 
the compatibility of networks and complexity, Morcol and Wachhaus note that agent-based 
simulations offer a method to examine these interactions for network theorists, while 
network analysis offers insight for complexity theorists about how the structure of the 
network can impact such interactions.183 They believe that complexity provides the 
conceptual grounding for network analysis to transcend its previous focus on networks as 
stable structures and examine them as dynamic, changing entities.184 
On the other hand, Barabasi believes that while prior work into complexity 
provided interesting insights, it failed to deliver any actual tools with which to work.185 
He posits that the key difference in integrating the network approach is the empirical 
observations of exponentially larger amounts of data regarding the interactions of complex 
systems than previously possible to collect.186 This data-driven approach of representing 
complex systems as networks provides a practical tool to not only map and analyze 
complex systems but also to test theory against real-world examples of complexity. As 
Barabasi states, “Networks are by their very nature the fabric of most complex systems, 
and nodes and links deeply infuse all strategies aimed at approaching our interlocked 
universe.”187 
B. NETWORKS AND SOCIETY 
A school of thought feels that the network effects of the modern age are so profound 
that they are creating a new form of society. Although precise definitions and timeframes 
differ, it is common to hear of an Information Revolution that has led to an Information 
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Age in academic literature, popular literature, and the media. Generally, the Information 
Age can be understood to track with the maturation of the internet from obscurity to 
ubiquity, perhaps reaching its current apotheosis with much of the population carrying 
internet-enabled smartphones every day. Those scholars often use the term “Network 
Society” when examining how networks increasingly are coming to define the societal 
order. 
The philosopher Castells has offered a comprehensive examination of the network 
society in his trilogy, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Castells posits, 
“networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of 
networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of 
production, experience, power, and culture.”188 Castells acknowledges that people 
connecting with each other and forming a network is not a new phenomenon, but argues 
that prior to the IT Revolution, networks were limited in ability and were outperformed by 
the forces of hierarchy and centralization in human societies.189 Since the IT revolution, 
the capabilities of this new technology have allowed network dynamics to explode and 
overtake the actions of each individual agent within a network.190  
Castells defines the IT revolution as the ongoing convergence of a number of strains 
of technology as diverse as telecommunications to genetic engineering, but all concerned 
with radical advances in the speed, reach, and sophistication of communications and 
information processing.191 This convergence leads to the creation of feedback loops that 
allow information processing to continue to grow exponentially.192 Just as the Industrial 
Revolution led to industrial society, Castells believes that the IT revolution is leading to an 
“informational society.” The informational society is “oriented towards … the 
accumulation of knowledge and towards higher levels of complexity in information 
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processing.”193 While higher levels of physical production are a likely byproduct of the 
advancements of the informational society, it is no longer the driving rationale; unlike 
previous re-orderings, such as the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions.194 
Castells explicitly identifies complexity theory as contributing to the understanding 
of the network society. In his view, the key advance of complexity theorists has been the 
focus on non-linear dynamic systems, which has led to the conceptual development of a 
theory that allows the networking of disparate fields of science.195 The study of complexity 
has fostered a mindset well suited to thinking about the network society. Acknowledging 
the self-organizing character of nature and society could result in the “epistemological 
value [of complexity]. Not that there are no rules, but that rules are created, and changed, 
in a relentless process of deliberate actions and unique interactions.”196  
Castells emphasizes that technology is not determinative, but rather demonstrates 
the flexibility and adaptability of a given society to new circumstances.197 By way of 
example, he notes that China possessed both gunpowder and oceangoing vessels before 
Europe, but did not engage in the Age of Exploration and Colonialism like Europe.198 The 
same holds true for the dawn of informational societies, the Soviet Union collapsed despite 
the presence of IT while America thrived.199 Thus, something of the individual character 
and history of a given society must remain even in the face of increasing 
interconnectedness and globalization and will be changed uniquely in the information age. 
Expressed in the language of complexity, the network society will exhibit path dependency. 
Ronfeldt developed a framework that concisely models the evolution of societies 
over time and accounts for the network society that he calls tribes, institutions, markets, 
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networks (TIMN).200 Each of the four forms has been present in some degree in society 
from the beginning, but they have formally developed at different times in different 
societies, roughly in sequence.201 In Ronfeldt’s view, societal evolution is a matter of 
incorporating new forms, not discarding wholesale old ones. Information age society will 
incorporate networks to have a blend of all four forms present.202 Additionally, he notes 
that the “pure” archetypes of each form do not exist in the real world, because they coexist 
and interact with other forms, which influences both forms.203 The assimilation of each 
new form, generally spurred by one or more technological advances, leads to greater 
amounts of complexity in society.204 In some sense, a new form is incorporated when the 
old forms had reached the level of their incompetence in managing complexity. The 
successful transition reallocates societal functions among the forms best suited to handle 
them.205 
The first basis of societal organization in the TIMN framework is the tribe. 
Although exact tribal arrangements have existed in many variations throughout history, the 
key defining aspect of this form is a kinship-based system of organization.206 The tribe 
proved effective at providing common identity and bonding for its members, while 
struggling to manage systems and problems effectively that involve more than a relatively 
small number of people.207 Top-down hierarchies evolved to handle such situations and 
allowed for the creation of large-scale institutions.208 Although particular details differ, 
hierarchies can generally be described as “centralized and built around chains of command; 
bureaucratization occurs as they become more elaborate and technically oriented. Partly 
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borrowing from tribal culture, this form thrives on ritual, ceremony, honor, and duty.”209 
The weakness of the institutional form is an inability to manage “complex exchanges and 
information flows” proficiently.210 Market forms of organization evolved to allow more 
complex interchanges to occur, while remaining “competitive and quite atomized.”211 
Every stage of societal development in this framework has required new and more 
capable technology for processing information, but the technology of the information age 
has empowered and expanded network beyond the more limited manifestations previously 
present in society.212 The technology of the Information Age erodes centralization, 
breaches the boundaries of closed systems, and provides the dense flows of information 
needed for networks to function as a new, fourth form of society.213 Ronfeldt places a 
particular emphasis on what he terms “all channel” networks where individual agents are 
widely dispersed and not artificially bounded as the type of networks that are the final form 
in his framework.214 These networks work best without centralized control and when 
agents “have agendas that are interdependent and benefit from consultation and 
coordination.”215 
True Information Age societies must find a way to assimilate all four forms of 
organization in the framework. This assimilation is not an easy accomplishment, as every 
incorporation of new forms roils society as existing institutions and actors must seek a new 
balance.216 In the process of seeking this balance, conflict is likely to arise between the 
proponents and values of both the old and new orders.217 While disruptive, ultimately, this 
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process provides feedback to older forms; they are spurred to adapt and grow and emerge 
as more capable organizations within a somewhat smaller sphere of responsibility in 
society.218 Ultimately, Ronfeldt believes that networks will most strengthen civil society 
actors, who will form networks that function as a newly empowered counterweight to states 
and markets.219 
C. NETWAR—A THEORY OF CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
Ronfeldt notes that as each form has been fully incorporated into society, an 
increase in social stratification has occurred; upon the mature integration of network forms 
into society, stratification is likely to revolve around access to information.220 In his 
examination of the dynamics of the network society, Castells observes that networks 
further the explosion of information processing, grow exponentially, and penalize 
exclusion from the network.221 Thus, the dynamics of complex networks will have a 
destabilizing effect, as feedback loops are likely to cause the penalties from being excluded 
from economic and civil networks to scale non-linearly. Castells warns that “discarded, 
devalued people” either who are not able to or who fail to connect to the various 
mainstream networks will connect to illicit, criminal networks.222 Therefore, an 
understanding of how networked conflict will function is of critical importance for 
ensuring the security of society. 
National security analysts Arquilla and Ronfeldt have developed a theory of 
conflict they call “netwar” that builds off the understanding of the power of networks and 
the Information Age expressed in Ronfeldt’s TIMN framework. According to Ronfeldt and 
Arquilla:  
The term “netwar” denotes an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at 
societal levels, involving measures short of war, in which the protagonists 
use – indeed, depend on using – network forms of organization, doctrine, 
 
218 Ronfeldt, 26. 
219 Ronfeldt, 3, 30. 
220 Ronfeldt, 17. 
221 Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 71. 
222 Castells, “Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society,” 12. 
44 
strategy, and communication. These protagonists generally consist of 
dispersed, often small groups who agree to communicate, coordinate, and 
act in an internetted manner, often without a precise central leadership or 
headquarters. Decision making may be deliberately decentralized and 
dispersed.223 
This “cross-cutting meta pattern about network forms of organization, doctrine, and 
strategy” is capable of being used by both those who promote and those who would harm 
civil society.224 Therefore, those engaged in netwar do not always need to be opposed by 
the state; cooperation with NGOs engaged in positive netwars has occurred and can be a 
valid response.225 
Netwar is inherently non-linear, as victory is divorced from sequentially achieving 
geographic objectives but is instead secured by accruing advantages throughout an arena 
not constrained by geographical boundaries.226 Its effectiveness rests on two trends in the 
Information Age, the increasing power of small groups and the increasing prevalence of 
network organizations.227 As a hierarchy, the state has been slow to adopt aspects of these 
trends, but a range of groups including terrorists, organized crime syndicates, other 
criminals (such as street gangs, smugglers, and counterfeiters), and social activists have 
been adopting netwar qualities.228 Actors from across these spheres have been observed 
forming networks that have generally flat structures and the capability for dense 
communications with some level of unifying ideology or objectives.229 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt have identified five levels of analysis that affect the 
effectiveness of a network for waging netwar: the organizational, narrative, doctrinal, 
technological, and social levels.230 The organizational level examines in detail the 
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structure of the network, as a “meta pattern” netwar admits to many varieties of network 
forms, so the particular configurations of any given real-world instance will need to be 
charted and analyzed.231 The second level is the narrative level, which is about the 
narrative believed by the network and not propaganda. Narratives are used to express a 
sense of identity and communicate “cause, purpose, and mission,” often in a succinct 
fashion.232 
The doctrinal level regards the processes by which networks are able to operate 
without central direction or the existence of hierarchy. Arquilla and Ronfeldt have 
identified two major components, decentralized leadership and swarming.233 One form of 
decentralized leadership is consultation and consensus seeking by the individual nodes of 
the network (be they individuals, cells, or organizations).234 NGOs engaged in social 
netwars appear to operate by the doctrinal principles of “collective diversity” (any and all 
organizations that can discern any connection to their purpose will join in) and 
“coordinated anarchy” (each NGO will individually decide what action to take, but will 
work cooperatively with others when it does decide to act).235 Similar principles would 
seem to apply to other kinds of actors engaged in different forms of netwar (such as 
terrorism or crime). 
Swarming is perhaps the most well-developed portion of netwar as a theory of 
information age conflict. Swarming is “the systematic pulsing of force … by dispersed, 
internetted units, so as to strike the adversary from all directions simultaneously … 
emphasis is placed on forces or fires that can strike at will—wherever they will.”236 The 
sustainable pulsing of swarm networks is most effective when carried out by small groups 
that work in conjunction to pulse and then disperse afterwards, until they decide to pulse 
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again.237 Although most of their conceptual work on swarming uses the language of 
military conflict, it is a defining characteristic of netwar in all varieties. The examples of 
social netwars waged by activist groups in Mexico and Serbia in the 1990s shows that 
pulsing of a swarm need not be acute; it can happen over longer time frames.238 
Swarming, like networks, is held as achieving its ultimate expression in the 
Information Age despite earlier examples that can be found in history. Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt propose a four-stage framework of the evolution of conflict; a melee of single 
combatants that gives way to massed, but rigid groups, supplanted by maneuver units, and 
finally evolving into swarming.239 The advancement to each successive form of conflict 
has required the development of more advanced information processing capabilities.240 
Effective swarming requires robustly linked and networked nodes to coordinate action and 
facilitate information sharing and sensing.241 Thus, each node in the swarm not only 
contributes to the conflict with the antagonist, but also serves as a sensory organ gathering 
information and communicating it throughout the network for a distributed strategic 
picture.242 
The final two levels of analysis are the technological and the social. The 
technological level provides the dense and robust communication links needed to form 
networks and to carry out operations. The technological advances of the Information 
Revolution are essential for networks to function at the level necessary to surpass 
hierarchical structures.243 The social level is the field of classic social network analysis, 
though in this sense, it is separated from network dynamics (which function as the 
organizational level). Successful netwar groups tend to have some sort of group social 
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identity, and the patterns of how the people in the groups know and interact with each other, 
will affect the network as a whole.244 
As befits Information Age conflict, the conduct of netwar has a strong 
epistemological dimension, as it is likely to be more about disrupting or undermining 
society instead of causing destruction or casualties.245 The network will “[try] to disrupt, 
damage, or modify what a target population ‘knows’ or thinks it knows about itself and the 
world around it.”246 This conduct can take the form of both direct challenges to the 
discovery and retention of information, as well as redefining societal narratives and 
imagery.247 One example of this struggle over societal knowledge is efforts by criminals 
ranging from urban street gangs to international drug cartels to portray themselves as pillars 
of the civil society, or as Robin Hood types at worst.248 This scenario is a direct challenge 
to the ability of the hierarchy to define societal knowledge of who and what a criminal is. 
The tendency of netwar operations to cross boundaries, both literal and figurative, 
presents a challenge for governments to react effectively to, as responsibility is usually 
apportioned within discrete jurisdictions.249 In response, Arquilla and Ronfeldt suggest 
that security organizations should adopt hybrids that merge hierarchies with networks, 
“particularly … with actors at the low intensity end of the spectrum of conflict and 
crime.”250 They stress the need to understand and adapt to Information Age dynamics, 
because many organizations only focus on adding new technology and do not adjust their 
doctrinal and organizational approaches.251 Adding faster and more efficient computers to 
an organization may speed up data processing, but does not in itself move the form from a 
hierarchy to a network. 
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D. COMPLEXITY AND NETWAR 
Complexity is referenced only obliquely by netwar theory. Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
differentiate their conception of swarming from an early computer model of complex 
adaptive systems developed at the Santa Fe Institute because no identifiable shared 
strategic picture or identity existed.252 They contrast the “flocking” of the CAS model with 
the swarming carried out by street activists at protests in Seattle and London in 1998, and 
Washington, DC, in 2000, because the disparate groups of protestors were united by a 
shared ideology and doctrine, even if their tactical decisions were decentralized.253 This 
fact should not disqualify the utility of CAS for understanding the dynamics of a networked 
organization as much of the early modeling of such systems was done with flocks of 
animals, such as birds and bees, and complexity theorists recognize that issues of identity 
and conscious thought pertain to human beings in ways they do not to other animals.254 
Models of relatively simple agents are a necessary step to work out general principles and 
dynamics of CAS prior to attempting to model agents capable of higher level thought like 
human beings. 
Much of the theoretical work on netwar has been performed on areas that come 
close to military conflict, such as terrorism and insurgency. It is not surprising, as the 
concept emerged from an analysis of the impact of the Information Age on national 
security, but even from the beginning, it has been held out as having explanatory power for 
crime and social activism. When netwar has been applied to crime, it has mostly been 
applied to transnational criminal organizations.255 These organizations may be more 
networked and decentralized than previous, but they still share an element of conscious 
association that generally makes identifying an explicit shared ethos or ideology fairly 
easy. 
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The principle of self-organization by complex systems provides a mechanism to 
extend the netwar theory below the level of explicitly organized movements to street crime 
and activism. This extension is a result of further developments of the information and 
communication technologies that have accounted for the rise of networks as an increasingly 
dominant social and organizational form. Much of the work about netwar appeared 
primarily between 1993 and 2001 and identifies technology like fax machines and peer-to-
peer computing (in the form of Napster) as enabling the links necessary for decentralized 
networks to form and operate.256  
Two major technological advances occurred in the intervening years that have made 
the communication linkages between people even denser and more pervasive, the 
smartphone and social media. Facebook serves as an instructive example of social media 
(to say nothing of Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, and a variety of other platforms). Facebook 
went online in 2004 as a platform for students, and then expanded to anyone over the age 
of 13 in 2006.257 As of the end of 2019, Facebook claimed a total of 2.45 billion registered 
users and over 1.6 billion daily users.258 The combination of advanced microprocessors 
with third generation network technology (sufficient to allow practical video transmission) 
combined to launch smartphones on the market in 2008.259 The computing power of 
smartphones, now sufficient to utilize social media themselves fully, has consistently 
increased to the point that it has not only surpassed the capabilities of earlier computers but 
is displacing desktops and laptops for increasing numbers of people across the planet.260 
The combination of these technologies has made the web of already dense 
communication flows that exist even richer and more robust than they were when these 
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theories were initially proposed. Castells posits that meaning produces culture, and that 
meaning is the result of continual interactions between people.261 Thus, given the modern 
state of the Information Revolution, individuals can have exponentially more continual 
interaction than was possible 20 years ago. As elements within these sorts of densely 
connected environments have been found to self-organize into complex systems, it seems 
very possible for these interactions to generate a shared ethos, ideology, or strategic view 
even without membership in an explicit organization.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt do note that the “small world” type of networks discovered 
by complexity theorists were observed in the social netwars waged in Seattle and Mexico 
and seem likely to characterize terrorist and criminal networks.262 Advances in the study 
of complex networks are likely to provide the robust analysis of the networks called for by 
the organizational and social levels of analysis. Complexity holds promise for explaining 
the underlying dynamics of the decentralized operations that have been observed in the 
doctrinal level of analysis. For example, Arquilla and Ronfeldt note that the chief defense 
of networks is their resiliency in the face of disruptions by the loss of specific nodes.263 
The concept of the edge of chaos, developed in the study of complex adaptive systems, 
provides an explanation of how this resilience arises from densely linked nodes within a 
complex system. Complexity seems well poised to provide conceptual grounding as netwar 
is extended along the lower end of the conflict scale and more granular analyses of specific 
instances are performed. 
This fusion with complexity is an extension of netwar beyond the original work 
done on the concept, but it seems to follow the logic of the underlying technological and 
social developments. It may become even more critical, given how people understand the 
network society. Arquilla and Ronfeldt note that some states may be more incentivized to 
start netwars because they have “low connectivity to their own societies as well as others,” 
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which decreases their vulnerability to retaliatory netwar.264 Castells’s earlier warning 
about a class of “discarded, devalued” people who will form their own networks due to low 
connectivity with the licit network society indicates that a great potential exists for these 
antagonistic networks to wage a netwar against civil society. 
Finally, this section must conclude with a brief commentary about the name 
“netwar.” As a conceptual framework of Information Age conflict, it has value for law 
enforcement; crime is a conflict between the criminal and his victim. In the current milieu, 
the suffix of “war” being present in the name of the theory and much of the work expressing 
concepts in terms of armed conflict is likely to be problematic. A societal argument is being 
advanced that the police are “militarized” and multiple organizations are lobbying for 
measures to be taken to reverse this trend.265 Arquilla and Ronfeldt explicitly posit that 
netwar is about conflicts other than armed conflict and provide multiple examples of social 
advocacy organizations employing this framework. They also stress that to implement truly 
the mindset of the Information Age requires a true paradigm shift in thinking that rejects 
reflexive bellicosity.266 “Netwar” is a pithy, six-character appellation that is much less 
unwieldy than something like “networked Information Age conflict” and so it has been 
retained for use in this work. However, given the current controversies regarding American 
policing, rebranding will likely prove necessary if it is to be applied more widely. 
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IV. COMPLEXITY, NETWORKS, AND CRIME 
The preceding two chapters have laid out a theoretical groundwork in complexity 
theory and network theory, both of which are concerned with how systems of densely 
connected agents interact. When the agents in a complex adaptive system are people, it can 
perhaps best be thought of as a complex adaptive network. Since the Information 
Revolution, tremendous advances in communications technologies have woven especially 
dense communication connections between people by sustaining and unleashing the 
dynamics of complex networks. Scholars, such as Castells and Ronfeldt, have argued that 
people are now entering a stage where these complex networks are becoming the driving 
organizational force in society. 
Law enforcement is currently a hierarchical organization, competent in the simple 
and complicated domains and dominated by a linear view of crime. However, if crime is 
subject to the same forces changing society in the Information Age, it may begin to operate 
in the complex domain. The proliferation of advanced, portable communications 
technology may provide dense enough connections for self-organizing complex networks 
to form and drive crime at all levels, from street crime to international crime. If this is the 
case, law enforcement will need to adapt to a complexity-based approach to fighting crime. 
This chapter is an examination of crime as a complex problem. It begins with an 
overview of the current, linear understandings of crime. It then proceeds to examine street 
crime, using street robberies to limit the scope, for evidence of complex behavior. Finally, 
it concludes with some brief thoughts on the implications of a complex view of crime. 
A. LINEAR VIEWS OF CRIME 
Much of the current thinking about crime and the resultant strategies is dominated 
by the linear epistemology set forth by Jayanti. Police officers and the wider law 
enforcement community as a whole are used to thinking about crime in both simple and 
complicated terms. As previously noted, the application of Newtonian principles to 
problem solving has yielded great advancements. As organizations outside the realm of 
physical sciences have applied those principles, they seek to reduce problems into terms 
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that are simple, measurable, and solvable.267 However, if crime is a complex phenomenon, 
it does not operate according to linear principles and strategies devised along reductionist 
lines will be ineffective. 
Many criminologists model crime in terms of the interactions between a handful of 
variables.268 One of the most common examples of modeling crime as a simple problem 
is the “crime triangle,” as seen in Figure 2. This triangle conceives of crime as a result of 
the interaction of three variables: offender, place, and target or victim. This model is 
seductively linear in thought; if one of three variables can be disrupted, then crime can be 
prevented.269 Even when allowing for the fact that achieving such disruptions can be more 
difficult to achieve in reality than in theory, this model accounts for the presumption of 
linearity outlined previously. Variables are kept to a limited number (even in some 
variations that superimpose a second triangle over the first), interact in set ways, and output 
is presented as proportional to input. 
 
267 Ramalingam, Aid on the Edge of Chaos, 126–28. 
268 Matthew Robinson, “Why Do People Commit Crime? An Integrated Systems Perspective,” in 
Applying Complexity Theory, ed. Aaron Pycroft and Clemens Bartollas (Bristol, United Kingdom: Policy 
Press, 2014), 72.  
269 “The Problem Analysis Triangle,” ASU Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, accessed October 
10, 2019, https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/problem-analysis-triangle-0. To be discussed shortly, Eck’s 
work on the crime triangle actually engages more, but not completely, with crime as a complex process. 
However, the concept is commonly presented solely in linear terms. For examples, see the treatment of the 
crime triangle by Oak Forest, IL (http://www.oak-forest.org/176/Crime-Prevention-Triangle) or North 
Miami Beach (https://www.citynmb.com/193/What-is-the-Crime-Prevention-Triangle).  
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Figure 2. Two Versions of the Crime Triangle.270 
Crime is often thought of in complicated terms as well, such as when outlining an 
organized crime family or cartel. Although large crime organizations can have many 
individual members, they are stratified into organized layers, with clearly defined lines of 
interaction between the different sections of the organization. The classic example of this 
type of organization is the Mafia.271 The trope of the corkboard layout of a mafia 
organization is familiar to those who have seen any number of television shows and films. 
Moreover, while the mafia may try to hide many of the relationships from outsiders, those 
relationships are knowable and understandable to experts, such as dedicated investigators 
and prosecutors. While the relationships between members of an organized crime syndicate 
may not be as neat and tidy as an organization chart (such as Figure 3) would suggest, 
treating individual groups as complicated problems has yielded excellent real-world 
results. The use of Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) laws, designed 
specifically to hold members of hierarchical criminal organizations responsible for the 
actions of their subordinates, is in large measure responsible for the diminished power and 
 
270 Source: ASU Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. 
271 “Mafia Org Chart,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed October 11, 2019, 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/mafia-family-tree.pdf/view. 
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prominence of the mafia.272 Conceive of a trial as experts (prosecutors and investigators) 
reducing and describing the links and functions of the pieces of a crime syndicate to a 
general audience (jurors); in other words, investing the effort to move the problem from 
the complicated domain to the simple one. 
  
Figure 3. Mafia Organization Chart.273 
 
272 Peter Reuter, “The Decline of the American Mafia,” Public Interest, no. 120 (Summer 1995): 95–
96; Lesley Suzanne Bonney, “The Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban Street Gangs: A Proper Application 
of RICO,” Catholic University Law Review 42 (Spring 1993): 593–98.  
273 Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Mafia Org Chart.” 
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Generally, law enforcement breaks crime down into crimes committed by 
individuals or those committed by organized groups. Typically, crimes committed by 
individuals (or groups of two and three, who do not have sufficient members to fill out an 
“org chart” style structure) are usually understood in the terms of a simple problem 
modeled on the crime triangle. Police officers work on disrupting the interactions of the 
three variables to solve the problem, via solutions like altering the deployment of officers 
(the location leg), community outreach (the victim leg), and proactive policing (the 
offender leg). Organized crimes are often understood in terms of a complicated problem, 
with investigators and prosecutors working on filling out an organizational chart of the 
command and control process of the group and how it commits its crimes. 
B. A COMPLEX VIEW OF CRIME 
Although complexity is not currently widely found in the praxis of law 
enforcement, some scholars have begun to engage with crime as a complex problem. 
Matthew Robinson uses the Integrated Systems Theory of Crime as an approach that not 
only describes crime as the result of continuous interaction between various factors and 
contexts, rather than the simple intersection of the crime triangle, but as something that can 
defy accurate predictions.274 Professor Glen Walters has integrated elements of nonlinear 
dynamic systems into his fourth revision of Criminal Lifestyle Theory, to include iteration, 
sensitive dependence, fractals, and self-organization.275 Melgarejo and Obregon examined 
a decade’s worth of burglary data in San Francisco in terms of mathematically analyzing 
the behavior of a complex system.276 
Other scholars have begun to use complex adaptive systems and agent-based 
modeling to examine crime. Richard Leary and Jenny Thomas articulate that organized 
crime (and conceptually similar activities like terrorism) better fit within the CAS 
 
274 Robinson, “Why Do People Commit Crime?,” 70–71. 
275 Walters, Modelling the Criminal Lifestyle, 1, 4–7. 
276 Miguel Melgarejo and Nelson Obregon, “Multifractal Approach to the Analysis of Crime 
Dynamics: Results for Burglary in San Francisco,” Fractals 25, no. 5 (2017): 1750043–2. Their research 
does not seem to posit a hard distinction between complexity and chaos theory, and presents much of the 
results in terms of chaotic behavior detected in the data. 
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framework.277 They argue that although an almost paramilitary hierarchy has been 
imposed to model organized crime, crime is actually committed by many criminals who 
know each other and interact in many different ways, which creates a system actually full 
of diverse variables that constantly changes and is not constrained to a limited set of past 
and future states.278 Magliocca and his coauthors developed an agent-based model of a 
CAS composed of cocaine traffickers and interdiction agents called NarcoLogic to test 
theories of the ability of narcotics distributors to adapt to government efforts to disrupt 
their business.279 At the other end of the narcotics distribution pipeline, Agar uses the 
concepts of complexity and CAS to provide explanations for the trends occurring among 
heroin users in Baltimore County, Maryland.280 
CAS has been used to explain the operations of groups like drug cartels and terror 
organizations, which all involve individuals consciously associating with each other to 
some degree in a larger organization (even if that organization is becoming more 
decentralized). Scholarship on Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s netwar concept has focused on 
these same types of organizations. Based on the tenets of both complexity and netwar 
theory, it should be possible to extend both concepts to self-organizing systems of street 
criminals. 
Given that CAS lacks central coordination, and noting the unique communications 
abilities of human beings as agents, particularly in the Information Age, it seems possible 
that aggregations of street crimes, such as robbery, theft from auto, and burglary could be 
modeled within the CAS framework. Individual criminals would be the decentralized 
agents within this framework, with the cumulative effects of their individual actions self-
organizing to form an interrelated system that adapts to changes in the environment around 
it, to include law enforcement responses to criminal activity. The “edge of chaos” in this 
 
277 Leary and Thomas, “How Complexity Theory Is Changing the Role of Analysis in Law 
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environment would be the balance between a system that is too orderly and therefore 
subject to stifling control by law enforcement, and a system that becomes too chaotic for 
any sort of pattern or structure to exist. This CAS would be likely to manifest as a complex 
network of nodes of actors enmeshed with each other by lines of communication. A self-
organized complex network might then display the hallmarks of networked conflict 
described by the theory of netwar.  
This concept is not an entirely new idea. John Eck is one of the leading scholars 
and proponents of a law enforcement model known as problem-oriented policing.281 A 
pattern of street crimes would meet Eck’s definition of a problem, as they are a group of 
harmful incidents connected in a meaningful way.282 The previously mentioned “crime 
triangle” is developed in Eck’s work as the routine activity triangle (RAT), and he develops 
a model with a system of feedback between the elements of the RAT that give rise to 
problems.283 He specifically denotes “problems as outgrowths of complex adaptive 
systems.”284 He notes that for his rudimentary CAS, learning and adaption are necessary 
and occurs via communication across networks of similar actors.285 
However, it appears that despite these descriptions Eck does not fully engage with 
the concept of crime as a CAS. As Jayanti noted previously, some explanations can appear 
“superficially” nonlinear while still being dominated by linear epistemology.286 Eck calls 
out as a line of enquiry the conundrum that some problems appear stable while others 
appear chaotic.287 However, with an understanding of self-organized criticality, this 
conundrum would not be surprising; CAS will be expected to ride the “edge of chaos” 
 
281 An excellent collection of literature and resources about this approach can be found at Arizona 
State University’s Center for Problem Oriented Policing at https://popcenter.asu.edu/. 
282 John Eck, “Police Problems: The Complexity of Problem Theory, Research and Evaluation,” in 
Problem-oriented Policing: From Innovation to Mainstream, ed. Johannes Knutsson, vol. 15, Crime 
Prevention Studies (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2003), 82.  
283 Eck, 89–91. 
284 Eck, 96. 
285 Eck, 93–94. 
286 Jayanti, “Through a Different Lens,” 103. 
287 Eck, “Police Problems,” 95. As always, terminology is somewhat at issue when different authors 
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between stability and disorder. Eck states that it is possible to begin with a solution to a 
problem and work backwards to figure out how to get there.288 This approach is a direct 
application of Jayanti’s fourth characteristic of linear epistemology, namely that time is 
reversible. Moreover, he expects a mature version of problem-oriented policing to be able 
to recommend best practices and develop a problem-solving protocol to be applied by 
individual officers.289 Best practices are suited to the linear domains of complicated and 
simple problems. His belief that the manifestations of a problem have the same root cause 
and that problems can be classed in a hierarchical scheme to drive appropriate responses is 
another demonstration of the prevalence of reductionism in his model.290 He describes his 
CAS as a network of communicating criminals, but he uses the term as a casual descriptor. 
He does not engage with any of the dynamics or behavioral influences suggested by 
network theory. 
What is needed then is to not only recognize aspects of complexity in street crime, 
but to fully embrace it as a CAS without then trying to impose linear thought on top of it. 
In a 2016 thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, Leverone examined if crowds (within a 
crowd control context for law enforcement) could be considered as complex adaptive 
systems. Leverone proposed a series of five questions that captured various markers of a 
CAS to be used in testing crowds: 
1. Does the crowd contain multiple, independent elements, devoid of a 
central authority? 
2. Are the interactions between elements characterized by nonlinearity? 
3. Does self-organization result from applying simple, unwritten rules? 
4. Do emergent behaviors begin to appear over time? 
5. Does the crowd adapt its behavior through metis?291 
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Leverone’s questions capture the essential properties of a CAS, even when not used 
within the context of examining crowds. As this analysis proceeds by examining street 
crime, the author would simply replace “crowd” with “system” when applying these 
questions to the question of street crime. Additionally, some theorists have proposed that 
the “simple rule requirement” for a CAS with humans as the agents does not necessarily 
apply. Stacey explains that the classic example of the simple rule requirement is the ability 
of three rules to explain the behavior of flocks of birds and that birds can be treated as 
identical agents in a way human beings cannot be. Stacey notes that other theorists who 
model CAS with agents who express differences with each other model those interactions 
without any sort of master set of instructions.292 Snowden and Boone argue that human 
beings demonstrate the unique abilities of being capable of switching between multiple 
identities, consciously calculating the outcomes of previous efforts when making choices 
about the future, and sometimes deliberately seeking to change a system to obtain a desired 
result.293 Levy notes that physical laws govern models of scientific systems, but social 
systems consist of agents capable of changing or even disobeying governing laws.294 Here 
an understanding of Holland’s mechanism of tagging is useful to recall as a means of 
generating rules. Each agent will develop a set of behavior guided by associating feedback 
with metaphorical tags, which will lead to the development of individualized rule sets. As 
street crimes are not linked as tightly in time and space as a crowd at a demonstration, self-
organization is more likely to result from individual agents testing and applying their own 
rule sets, which will express itself in the resiliency of the system as a whole. 
A second level of analysis is to take the agents within a CAS and see if they exhibit 
network structure and behavior. This analysis is problematic for law enforcement, as they 
will rarely have complete knowledge of all the agents within the CAS. If they did, they 
would probably have been able to shut down the system before it could reach self-
criticality. However, law enforcement can begin mapping and exploring network 
connections among those agents it is able to identify. Additionally, the presence of netwar 
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markers would serve as an indication of networked conflict. Swarming is the most 
developed of those concepts; secondary concepts include collective diversity and 
coordinated anarchy. 
For the purposes of this inquiry, street robberies will be the specific lens used to 
look for indications that street crimes are complex problems. Street robberies are examined 
as both general and particular phenomena by applying Leverone’s framework. When 
examining street robberies in the general sense, robbery is defined using the definition of 
a street robbery from the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Problem-Oriented Guide for 
Police on the subject. A robbery is a crime where “the offender targets a victim; the victim 
is a pedestrian and a stranger; the offender attempts or completes a theft of cash or property; 
the offender uses force or the threat of force against the victim; and the offense occurs in a 
public or semipublic space.”295 For the purposes of limiting the subject of inquiry, this 
definition excludes robberies of commercial establishments, robberies committed in a 
context of domestic violence, and carjackings or hijackings. As a particular case study, this 
thesis examines a robbery plan utilized by the Metropolitan Police Department’s Third 
District in Washington, DC, in September 2019 to show the behavior of a robbery system 
in the real world (see Appendix). The examination of the case study focuses on the 
definition and understanding of a robbery problem by the Metropolitan Police Department.  
The first question is if street robberies are committed by a multiplicity of 
independent actors or if a guiding authority is directing their actions. Although he is a 
fascinating literary figure, street crimes are generally not organized by a central, Moriarty-
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like figure.296 In 2016, 3,149 robberies were committed and 496 adults arrested for robbery 
in Washington, DC.297 Putting aside that the clearance rate (percentage of cases “solved”) 
is not 100% and that not all arrests are made for an offense that occurred that same year, 
even a population of approximately 500 individuals committing street robberies all 
operating under the control of a single, central authority would be an extraordinary 
development with no supporting evidence. Some criminals do organize into gangs, which 
provides for some guided decisions about committing crimes. The 2011 National Gang 
Threat Assessment stated that 1.3 million criminals separated into 33,000 gangs are 
responsible for an average of 48% of crime in the United States for the period of that 
report.298 Thus, even when allowing for some formalized command and control among the 
criminal element, a great diffusion of decision making still occurs but with no truly 
centralized control over criminal activity. 
The second question is if elements in the system interact non-linearly. Given the 
parameters of linearity set forth earlier in this paper, the first question is if robbery behaves 
proportionally and predictably. A 2018 study from a complexity scholar at the Santa Fe 
Institute demonstrates that robbery appears to literally (in the mathematical sense) scale 
nonlinearly when compared with city populations. Specifically, the study found that the 
total number of robberies and the number of offenders per robbery both increased greater 
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than a linear progression of increasing city population would suggest.299 The fact that 
robbery exists as a problem is a function of its inherent unpredictability. Knowing the 
averages of when robberies occur does not give accurate short-term predictions.  
Another characteristic of linearity is neat divisions between dependent and 
independent variables. This is not the case with street robberies, as no universal pool of 
constant, full-time robbers and designated victims exists. The pool of robbers itself can 
fluctuate, as not all individuals who will commit robbery are always operating in a mode 
where they are seeking to do so. The linkages to potential victims can fluctuate, be 
destroyed, or reform due to any number of factors from the behavior of the potential victim, 
a patrol car randomly turning into the block, the robber spotting a more tempting target (or 
even a more attractive activity than the impending robbery), or random chance. Thus, no 
fixed, dependent relationship exists between any given robber and a specific victim or 
victims. 
The final characteristic of linear interaction is susceptibility to reductionism. While 
the street robbery as a whole can be broken down into the individual cases, those individual 
cases do not explain the phenomenon as a whole. For law enforcement, closing a robbery 
by making an arrest is the most complete understanding that can be gained of an individual 
instance. All the human elements involved are known and interviewed, and all the 
surrounding details and circumstances are known and documented. The entire event is then 
carefully arranged and explained in a prosecution report presented to the judicial 
authorities. Should the event go to trial, these accounts are tested by being subject to cross-
examination in an adversarial proceeding. All this is to say that any individual instance of 
robbery can be known in great detail. However, the facts and circumstances in that one 
robbery are not the same for, and do not explain, all robberies that occur. 
Leverone’s third question regards the existence of self-organization. The case study 
of late summer robberies in Washington, DC’s Third District suggests that robbery self 
organizes into both smaller sub-systems, as well as a larger CAS. Sixty-six percent of the 
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robberies committed in the 30-day period addressed by the plan were committed by more 
than one offender working in concert, with group sizes of two and three being the most 
common.300 In his analysis of CAS, Eidelson observes, “creating subsystems within an 
organization may produce ‘pockets of collaboration’ that can spread throughout the 
system.”301 These “pockets of collaboration” seem to be present in the case study, formed 
by the small, self-organized groups of offenders committing robberies together. The larger 
system has self-organized to the “edge of chaos” and demonstrates resiliency in two ways. 
First, the system has endured despite the “shocks” of the arrest of 43 individuals for robbery 
within the Third District between July 12 and September 9, 2019.302 An arrest for robbery 
at least temporarily disables the offender, provides negative feedback regarding their 
actions, and increases the costs of participating in crime. Secondly, the system adapted to 
the deployment of resources along the U Street corridor by moving west and north.303 The 
deployment of police resources did not shut down (by either arresting or deterring) the 
robbery CAS, which adapted by shifting the physical location of its operation. 
Indications demonstrate that robbery behavior could be modeled by drawing up a 
number of simple rules or conditional statements for agents to obey. In their book, Armed 
Robbers in Action, Wright and his coauthors interviewed 81-armed robbers in Saint Louis, 
MO. Although they are not engaged in attempting to model criminal behavior when 
describing their findings, the information they report illustrates possible rules that may be 
generated to govern agent behavior in a CAS view of robbery. They note that 80 out of 81 
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individuals reported committing robbery because they felt an acute need for money.304 
Describing robbers who chose to target law-abiding individuals, their subjects reported 
performing an assessment of the danger posed by any given target.305 Finally, outward 
signs of prosperity displayed by the victims (expensive clothing, jewelry, possession of 
luxury items) were used to assess how lucrative a potential robbery would be.306 These 
parameters can be taken to suggest three rules to be used as an example of possible agent-
based rule sets that can be developed. It suggests that an agent may not be in the mode to 
commit a robbery without requiring an imminent acquisition of cash, agents will seek to 
rob only those individuals who do not appear to pose a threat to the agent, and agents will 
seek to rob those who display some reasonable, articulable sign of possessing valuables.  
Leverone’s fourth marker, emergent behavior will occur due to the self-
organization of the system as the agents constantly test various rules, repeating rules that 
lead to success, and discarding ones that lead to failure. One example of emergent behavior 
is the targeting of individuals in possession of what the DOJ calls CRAVED (concealable, 
removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, disposable) electronic items.307 In particular, 
targeting individuals with smartphones for robbery enjoyed rapid growth. In a joint press 
release with the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the mayor 
of Washington, DC, noted in 2012 a 54% increase in the number of robberies where 
smartphones were taken between 2007 and 2011, and in 2012, smartphone robberies 
comprised 38% of all robberies committed in Washington, DC.308  
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When robberies cluster, it too is an emergent behavior as the cluster is emerging 
from the individual actions of agents. As shown in Figure 4, robberies initially clustered 
along the U Street corridor, then moved west and north.309 The new clusters emerged 
without any central direction and as a result of the actions of individual agents (or 
individual “pockets of collaboration”). The existence of robberies outside the cluster areas 
shows other viable “hunting grounds,” so the new cluster areas are not necessary 
consequences of increased enforcement along U Street. Both the targeting of individuals 
with smartphones and the clustering of robberies in geographic areas are emergent because 
they are larger patterns or structures that exist within the system, but they are not a 
necessary consequence of observing any single robbery. Robberies occur outside of the 
cluster area and some people are robbed who do not have smartphones. 
  
 
Figure 4. Clustering of Robberies.310 
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Leverone’s final marker was experiential learning. As with central control, this 
point seems somewhat self-evident. While police officers obtain formal educations and 
training, nascent robbers have not attended any academy. Evidence for learning due to 
feedback can be found in Wright’s study of armed robbers, 35% of the robbers interviewed 
estimated that they had committed between 10 and 49 robberies over the course of their 
lifetime and 36% estimated that they had committed more than 49. Wright notes that these 
are estimates, as their subjects were unable to provide exact details, but that 21% were 
committing more than one robbery a week.311 This information suggests that robbers are 
fairly active, and thus, every robbery and every contemplated (but not consummated) 
robbery provides feedback to robbers from which they learn. 
Thus, an identified pattern of street robberies is possible that satisfies all five of 
Leverone’s proposed markers of a CAS. The behavior of the CAS observed in the case 
study also exhibits the main feature of networked conflict described by Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, swarming. The crime maps show a pulsing of robberies occurring in the emergent 
clusters, continuing for two months, and then occurring across all times of day. In fact, the 
“sustained pulsing” of those robberies in the concentrated areas drew the attention of the 
police to the robbery problem to begin with. The majority of the robberies during the time 
period were carried out by groups of two and three suspects able to strike and then disperse 
back into the population.312 These groups are able to serve the sensory function of 
swarming through the generation and testing of “rules” and their propagation throughout 
the CAS, which spreads information throughout the system. 
This situation creates a powerful suggestion that the netwar dynamic may be in 
play, but it cannot be conclusively proven from the data available. Currently, law 
enforcement’s view of these situations tends to be reductionist, focused on decomposing 
the problem down into its individual instances, rather than taking a network or systemic 
view of the problem. Thus, the kinds of data needed to be collected currently only allow 
for a thorough analysis of one of the five levels of analysis for determining the presence of 
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a netwar. The detection of a clear swarming function indicates that a key doctrinal pillar of 
netwar is present. Rudimentary data is gathered about three of the other four levels of 
analysis, although the current absence of a clear theoretical framework often means that 
this data lies scattered in individual case files instead of providing a systemic picture.  
The development of suspects (and, hopefully, their eventual arrest) provides 
starting points for an analysis of the organizational and social levels. The recognition of 
the markers of a CAS in operation provides an indication that a structure has self-organized, 
but it is still necessary to attempt to map the full structure of the system. Suspect identities 
are a first step in this process, but it is necessary to then attempt to discern how those 
isolated data points fit into a larger complex network. It is also a rudimentary insight into 
the social level of analysis, but too often police departments instead resort to noting 
overlapping suspects and odd coincidences and do not perform a rigorous social network 
analysis. Law enforcement is currently the most advanced at the technological level, as the 
usefulness of smartphones (and the variety of apps they can access) as evidence repositories 
is widely recognized. Only a slight change in perspective is required to move from the 
position of a focus on recovering evidence to be used in individual prosecutions to using 
lawfully gathered evidence to analyze a network structure. The narrative level of analysis 
may be the most difficult level for law enforcement to gather data on, as it requires more 
sociological than detective work.313 In their study of armed robbers, Wright and his 
coauthors described the difficulties in locating interview subjects and note that convincing 
them information would not be shared with the authorities was a primary concern.314 
Taken in whole, this scenario appears to be an identified instance of crime operating 
as a complex problem for law enforcement. It appears then that crime is evolving along 
with society in the Information Age and is beginning to be governed by network dynamics 
and complexity theory. Similarly, law enforcement will need to adapt itself to operate in 
the complex domain and begin thinking in terms of complex systems and dynamic 
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networks; insisting on a linear and reductionist approach to handling crime will prove 
futile. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF A COMPLEX VIEW OF CRIME  
Law enforcement practitioners will still need to understand individual robberies 
(and other street crimes) on a tactical level. Every reported robbery still has a victim who 
has suffered, and the amount of evidence required to support the arrest and conviction of 
suspects remains high. The power of modeling street robberies as a CAS occurs on the 
strategic level. When planning law enforcement activities to both prevent and respond to 
street robberies, leaders need to think of street robberies not as aggregations of single acts 
but as an integrated, living whole. 
A complexity-based approach to law enforcement is a matter of not only adopting 
new practices and techniques, but also establishing a real grounding in theory. It is 
necessary to recognize the markers of complexity and to transcend linear thinking when 
approaching complex problems. Although the linear epistemology is almost reflexive for 
many people when attempting to solve problems, the approaches it suggests cannot 
effectively deal with the operations of complex systems and networks. Failing to integrate 
theory truly will result in merely superficial changes, which are unlikely to perform much 
better that the models and tactics they are replacing. 
Law enforcement operating according to a complexity-based model will need to 
examine any CAS it interacts with as an organic whole and recognize the nonlinear 
dynamics that govern it. Bak notes that when dealing with systems that have reached the 
state of self-organized criticality, “no ‘quick-fix’ solutions [that] can stabilize the system 
and prevent fluctuations.”315 Those same dynamics make it impossible to develop accurate 
and detailed predictions of future states for the system.316 Rather, law enforcement must 
abandon the linear idea of a single fix and itself adopt an iterative approach to interacting 
with the system. Those interactions will cause change in the system, as the extraction of 
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information and resulting law enforcement action will provide feedback that will lead 
agents to modify their behavior.317 
Therefore, while law enforcement must be vigilant for the changes in the system, 
this mutability can also be harnessed with careful analysis and deliberate action. 
Insufficient connections between agents impair the ability of a CAS to adapt and self-
organize.318 The strategic response of law enforcement needs to focus on taking actions 
and gathering information to identify the linkages in the CAS so that considered, targeted 
disruptions can be made. Detailed and knowledgeable analysis of the CAS should be 
performed to try to identify possible iterative strategies and rule sets that have spread 
throughout the system so that efforts can be made to disrupt those particular aspects. This 
process will be ongoing, as the CAS will be changing in response to law enforcement’s 
actions, as well as environmental changes over time. Integration of network theory 
provides the intellectual framework to map and analyze these CAS, interpret the results of 
probes by law enforcement, and identify key structural linkages needed for the CAS to 
function. 
In the current state of affairs, an arrest for a crime, such as a street robbery, is 
usually considered the end of an investigation, save for some tidying up for prosecution (or 
perhaps closing out other cases for statistical purposes). Complexity-based policing would 
view an arrest as a launch pad, as law enforcement now has a window into the CAS and its 
associated network. Examining the linkages of any given arrested robber will uncover other 
nodes and provide more information about the actors in the system and how they are linked. 
A broader implication is that it calls for breaking down silos, as analysts will be just as 
much on the front lines of policing as the sworn officers. As detailed knowledge is gained 
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as to how individuals are linked into complex systems, experts in fields outside of law 
enforcement may become valuable employees and partners to police officers.319 
Agar states “Policy is built on linearity: change this regulation and that will 
result.”320 Increasingly, crime seems to be built on complexity instead of linearity. Law 
enforcement must come to embrace complexity and expand its competencies beyond the 
simple and complicated domains into the complex domain. Solid grounding in complexity 
theory is needed to break out of a linear epistemological frame and begin thinking and 
acting in nonlinear terms, and to advocate for and explain the need and value of such an 
approach. 
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V. BUILDING BLOCKS OF COMPLEXITY-BASED POLICING 
The revolution in IT has enmeshed everyone in webs of communication that grow 
ever denser. These effects are birthing a networked civilization that is altering all aspects 
of society, including crime. The lifeblood of this new form of civilization is dense flows of 
information that connects people as nodes in vast, complex networks. Complexity can be 
thought of as a kind of informational physics that provides the language and theory to study 
the behavior of densely connected systems. The complexity dynamics that drive crime can 
now be better identified, understood, and analyzed. Law enforcement must adapt to a 
complex environment; institutions and practices designed for a linear, predictable 
environment will perform poorly in a world defined by nonlinear, dynamic principles.  
It is important to remember that the procession of society through Ronfeldt’s TIMN 
network is an evolution that incorporates and renegotiates the role of previous elements 
that still function and provide value while integrating new, dominant modes. While law 
enforcement must evolve to a complexity-based model, that does not mean that all current 
forms and practices must be abandoned. This chapter looks ahead to see what currently 
exists in law enforcement’s tool kit that can serve as a foundation for complexity-based 
policing. It begins with a brief exploration of the role of information in organizations that 
are adapted to the Information Age. Next, it establishes what the current “standard model” 
of policing looks like, to serve as a point of comparison. The chapter concludes with an 
examination of some of the alternatives proposed to the standard model and analyzes the 
extent to which they are compatible with complexity.  
A. POLICING FOR THE INFORMATION AGE 
Adapting to Information Age society will require changes to both the doctrines and 
organizations of police departments and other law enforcement agencies. Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt delineate two views of information within organizations, processing versus 
structural.321 The processing view is more common and tends to focus on adding 
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technology to inputs and outputs of data faster and more efficient.322 The structural view 
of information is about the “identity, meaning, and purpose” of an organization.323 Put 
another way, the structural view is about the information (often subconsciously) embedded 
in an organization so that “people know (and are trained to know) what to do and why, in 
an organized manner.”324 It is common to attempt to adapt to new circumstances by simply 
adding new technology to an organization, but does not effect any fundamental change in 
the nature of the organization or in what it “knows.”325 
Many police departments have added cutting-edge computers and communications 
technology to their arsenals, but only use them to speed up or extend their prior modes of 
carrying out operations. The mere possession of modern IT does not mean that an 
organization is aware of, or is operating in, the complex domain. Both Castells and 
Ronfeldt note that technology is a necessary, but not sufficient ingredient for the formation 
of the network stage of society.326 As strong hierarchies exercising control via onerous 
bureaucracy can characterize most police departments, they are capable of instituting a 
governing structure over operations. This structure is often rigid enough that it is able to 
limit the formation of the dense, adaptable webs needed for complex behaviors to begin to 
manifest.  
Ronfeldt notes that thanks to the Information Revolution, society is on the cusp of 
developing sensory apparatuses of unprecedented size and scope.327 As information 
processing surpasses productive capacity as the primary metric of organizational 
effectiveness, Information Age organizations and networks will be about sensory functions 
that gather, exchange, and process information. These kinds of organizations will be 
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fundamentally different from production-oriented ones, and the future requires that 
innovation stop looking backwards at production.328  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt posit that Information Age conflict will no longer be a matter 
of attrition or annihilation, but of information dominance that leads to disruption, which 
prevents effective resistance.329 Their language is that of military analysts, but it is easy to 
extend their vision to law enforcement as crime falls elsewhere on the spectrum of 
conflict.330 Law enforcement agencies must adapt to become sensory organizations that 
seek information dominance of their environments. Arrests will still be necessary to combat 
crime, but they will be targeted to disrupt complex adaptive networks instead of blindly 
chasing after suspects in every individual instance of crime. This information centric view 
of law enforcement will require agencies to adapt both their processing and structural views 
of information. 
B. THE STANDARD MODEL OF POLICING 
Before exploring the possibilities for the future, the current state of policing should 
be defined. The modern institution of the police dates back to the mid-19th century in 
America, during a time when policing (like other government services) was closely 
associated with the dominant political machines of the era.331 The Reform Era succeeded 
this time, when a concerted effort was made to professionalize policing; this era reached 
its height in the 1960s and early 1970s.332 What has become known as the “standard model 
of policing” is the practices generally in use at the end of the Reform Era. The increasing 
number of scholars criticizing the effectiveness of this model and proposing alternatives to 
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it since the middle of the 1970s has further cemented Reform Era policing as the current 
baseline of police practices.333 
Weisburd and Eck have identified five key characteristics of the standard model of 
policing: 
1. Increasing the size of police agencies 
2. Random patrol across all parts of the community 
3. Rapid response to calls for service 
4. Generalized investigations of crime 
5. Generally applied intensive enforcement and arrest policies334 
Calling it the standard model is a deliberate choice, for it denotes that police 
operations and services have, in large part, become standardized. The standard model 
assumes that a reactive template of policing can be applied without regard to the particular 
circumstances of any given community.335 Weisburd and Eck note that use of the standard 
model often leads to a greater concern with the administration of police service, measured 
through metrics, such as the number of cars in service, average response time to calls, than 
on actual improvements to public safety.336 Indeed, they note that limited demonstrated 
evidence is available concerning the effectiveness of each individual prong.337 Perhaps the 
most well-known example is the Kansas City patrol experiment that showed random 
patrols exerted little impact on crime rates in studied areas.338  
The standard model of policing is effectively a design for a production-oriented 
organization. This is not a surprise, given that it evolved between 1930–1970, a time when 
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American industry was crucial to winning the Second World War and positioning America 
as not only a global hegemon, but also the embodiment of capitalism during the Cold War. 
The standard model is industrial in its outlook, directly producing reports, investigations, 
arrests, and prosecutions with the underlying assumption that if enough of those goods are 
produced, a profit of public safety will be realized. Kelling observes that the innovators of 
the Reform Era were following the principles of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management; 
a system for increasing productivity through essentially adopting assembly line 
techniques.339 Accordingly, police procedures were standardized, broken down into 
constituent steps, and police officers trained to perform their specific tasks efficiently while 
managers coordinated between different “production units” within the departments.340 
An industrial, production modeled organization is well suited to the realms of both 
simple and complicated problems (Figure 5). Taylorism is explicitly reductionist that 
breaks any process down into a series of simple steps, each linked one to the next. 
Moreover, while complicated problems may call for the expert knowledge of professionals, 
it fits well with the mindset of the progressive thinkers of the Reform Era, who saw 
themselves as specialized technicians who would be solely responsible for the 
administration of public safety.341 Law enforcement is very comfortable with the simple 
and complicated models of crime, and the standard model of policing seems to provide 
solutions in these realms; it is merely a question of efficiently allocating resources to 
produce enough investigations, arrests, and prosecutions to “solve” the problem of crime. 
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Figure 5. The Cynefin Framework.342 
Both the simple and the complicated domains are the province of linearity, and the 
standard model of policing falls squarely within Jayanti’s framework for linear 
epistemology. Nothing better demonstrates the standard model’s assumption that closed 
models are sufficient for open systems than its reliance on maps. Maps are ubiquitous 
within the standard model; police officers are assigned beats (slivers of the map) and 
managers are held responsible for their own sub-sectors of the map. Activity, both police 
and criminal, is tracked and represented on the map. Maps are inherently a closed model, 
drawing hard borders, and limiting perspectives. Maps also both process and structure 
information; processing information by serving as a reference to someone’s physical 
location but also structuring it by embedding information about the division of the world 
and the limits of someone’s responsibility.343 
The standard model is itself a template, so it fulfills Jayanti’s second characteristic 
of universal applicability. The standard model’s embrace of formalized reductionism via 
scientific management is likewise an affirmation that both police work and crime are 
merely the sums of their parts. Likewise, the focus on the proportionate geographic 
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allocation of police resources affirms the standard model’s belief that reverse engineering 
is possible, a linear model of cause and effect is in place, and that the future can be forecast. 
Finally, the standard model’s emphasis on stability of strategy and resource allocation 
assumes a system that is in overall equilibrium. In sum, the standard model of policing is 
designed for a linear, production-dominated environment, instead of a complex, 
networked, and information-dominated environment. 
C. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF POLICING 
Beginning in the 1970s, a number of scholars began studying various aspects of the 
standard model of policing to attempt to measure their actual effectiveness. A notable 
segment of academics and professionals began to doubt the effectiveness of the standard 
model, and since the middle of the 1990s, a number of alternative models have been 
proposed and experimented with.344 Many of these approaches have been adopted, whole 
or in part, by various police departments. Many departments incorporate more than one of 
these alternatives, even when their tenets clash with each other. Departments have adopted 
these multiple approaches for a variety of reasons: desire to innovate, adherents within the 
management structure, and political necessity or expediency. To date, none of these 
approaches has displaced the standard model as the dominant approach or strategy to 
policing in America. 
A growing body of literature about these various alternatives is becoming available, 
with supporters and critics of each method to be found. However, this literature approaches 
the problem from a linear epistemological frame, which embeds the assumption that crime 
is either a simple or complicated phenomenon. As both society and crime come to be 
dominated by complex network forms, linear epistemologies and methods will prove 
insufficient to devise solutions to problems. Arquilla and Ronfeldt state that when 
“designing a strategy for netwar may mean grouping together from a new perspective a 
number of measures that have been used before but were viewed separately.”345 Thus, this 
section examines some of the most prominent alternative models of policing from the 
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perspective of complex adaptive networks and netwar to identify the extent they are 
congruent with these theoretical frameworks. 
1. Compstat 
Due to the immersion of traditional thinking about policy and law enforcement in 
linear epistemology, statistics have come to be a major driver of strategy because statistical 
analysis can provide useful information about linear problems. This use of statistics in law 
enforcement strategy often takes the form of a Compstat-like (compare statistics) program. 
Compstat was a program instituted in the New York City Police Department (NYPD) 
where police managers meet with the leadership of the department. These managers are 
engaged in a dialogue with leadership about a variety of statistics tallied to examine 
weekly, monthly, and yearly timeframes. The managers are expected to demonstrate to the 
upper ranks that they have knowledge of the trends in their commands and to plan future 
activity.346 Although not necessarily using the Compstat “brand name,” similar programs 
quickly spread throughout police departments in the United States, with one third of major 
city departments having implemented such a program only five years after its introduction 
by New York.347 
Compstat has often been advertised as a method to prevent crime by the cities and 
departments implementing the program, and organizational flexibility and innovative 
problem solving have been identified as key components of the program, at least in 
theory.348 Yet, scholar David Wesiburd and his colleagues have found that Compstat has 
the effect of centralizing control over middle managers and reinforcing the traditional 
hierarchy of control within a police department.349 As Weisburd and his colleagues argue, 
“Compstat is appealing precisely because it holds out the promise of innovation in police 
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organization, strategies, and tactics but does not demand a revolution in the organizational 
structure of American policing. Rather, it preserves—indeed, claims to reinvigorate—the 
traditional structure of the military model of policing.”350 Even some advocates note that 
Compstat has become a tool of centralization within the NYPD, as the focus has been on 
the “technocratic” aspects of the program instead of the philosophical foundation behind 
Bratton’s original innovation.351 
Overall, Compstat has little to offer as a strategy for policing in the Information 
Age. Its fatal flaw is a fundamental reliance on statistics to drive strategy. In non-linear 
environments, statistics do not provide meaningful information. Economist Friedrich 
Hayek explained that statistics were “impotent” to deal with complex phenomena because: 
The statistical method is therefore of use only where we either deliberately 
ignore, or are ignorant of, the relations between the individual elements with 
different attributes, i.e., where we ignore or are ignorant of any structure 
into which they are organized…It is however, for this reason irrelevant to 
the solution of problems in which it is the relations between individual 
elements with different attributes which matters.352 
In non-linear domains, and particularly when dealing with complex systems expressed as 
networks, the relationships between the elements are the key aspects to understand. 
Additionally, the features of the Compstat program still structurally embed a linear 
understanding of the world. Critics acknowledge that Compstat’s combination of statistics 
and mapping led to some innovation in problem identification but note that the solution 
offered is generally the application of the standard model of policing.353 Compstat retains 
a geographic focus, which, as discussed previously, is indicative of a foundational 
assumption that a closed system exists. The operational focus is placed on commands 
 
350 Weisburd et al., 446. 
351 Eli B. Silverman and John A. Eterno, “CompStat’s Innovation,” in Police Innovation: Contrasting 
Perspectives, ed. David Weisburd and Anthony Braga, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2019), 412.  
352 Hayek, “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” 152–153. 
353 David Weisburd et al., “Changing Everything so That Everything Can Remain the Same: 
CompStat and American Policing,” in Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives, ed. David Weisburd 
and Anthony Braga, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 425.  
82 
defined by territory, with specialized units made subject to the needs of territorial 
commanders.354 Compstat reinforces hierarchical command structure, which falls squarely 
within practices Snowden has identified as best suited for the complicated domain, where 
determining best practices and seeking efficiencies in process will yield success.355 Even 
advocates for Compstat like Silverman and Eterno concede that it “cannot be a fully viable 
entity” without widespread organizational changes that emphasize information sharing, 
problem solving, accountability, and decentralization.356 
2. Problem-Oriented Policing 
Problem-oriented policing is a model of policing that posits that police should focus 
on solving “problems,” which are clusters of related types of incidents that bedevil a 
particular community.357 It is the evolution of a concept first proposed by Herman 
Goldstein in 1979, which suggested that the police needed to begin proactively identifying 
and addressing persistent issues in the communities they patrolled to prevent crime from 
occurring.358 Proponents of problem-oriented policing believed that the standard model’s 
focus on reported incidents as the unit of work created a system that would inherently 
reinforce tendencies to perform reactive tasks only; the hope was that reframing the focus 
to persistent problems would drive proactive strategies.359 
Although the exact method for implementing problem-oriented policing varies 
from agency to agency, the SARA model has emerged as a fairly standard template. SARA 
stands for scanning, analysis, response, and assessment.360 The key to differentiating 
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problem-oriented policing from the standard model lie in the analysis and response phases. 
Analysis of problems must go beyond merely identifying suspects into many other types 
of data that may shed light on underlying causes; the response phase should include many 
actions beyond making arrests, to include prompting community groups and other 
government agencies to carry out specific, pre-identified tasks.361 Ideally, the process 
concludes with a rigorous, often quantitative, assessment of the solutions implemented to 
identify successes, failures, and areas for future improvement.362 A further goal of many 
practitioners of problem-oriented policing is to begin associating specific types of solutions 
with types of problems to create various pre-assembled toolkits that can be used in the 
future for others facing the same problem.363  
Much about problem-oriented policing would seem to lend itself to a complexity-
based approach to policing. As was previously discussed, Eck, one of the main proponents 
for problem-oriented policing, has used some concepts from complexity in his work, but 
has not fully embraced complexity as the theoretical paradigm governing crime and police 
work.364 
The strategic aspects of problem-oriented policing started as a headquarters 
function, but has become more decentralized in recent years. Eck believes that it should 
remain in the upper echelons of an organization because problem analysis performed by 
street officers as a collateral duty is generally of a reduced quality.365 Critics of problem-
oriented policing agree that as it is currently structured in most agencies, individual street 
officers lack a true ability to engage in problems solving, support from analytical units, the 
ability to make or leverage connections, and generally rely on enforcement as their solution 
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to problems.366 A sensible middle point between these two positions is adopting small 
teams or squads as the location for the problem-solving function. An agency utilizing an 
approach organized around multiple teams could fulfill the recommendation by Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt that governments adopt hybrids of hierarchies and networks to confront 
networked adversaries. 
Many of Eck’s observations about the actual practice of problem-oriented policing 
are also congruent with complexity. He notes that while SARA is presented as a linear 
model, it is often applied iteratively in the real world.367 An iterative application of this 
model would be beneficial, as it would capture the adaptions of complex adaptive networks 
to changing conditions, as well as apply the benefits of iterative adaption for police 
agencies seeking to harness complexity for the community’s benefit. Eck lays out five 
premises behind problem-oriented policing, which include “that the causes of these 
troubles [brought to the police] are often complex,” “that the police should make systemic 
enquiries into these complexities,” and “learning from successful and unsuccessful 
innovations makes police more effective.”368 Eck appears to be using complex in the 
colloquial sense in these assertions, but by using the technical sense of the word, those 
premises become literally true. The final premise again speaks to adaptive, iterative 
learning.  
Finally, he notes several hallmarks of a good problem-oriented policing strategy, 
all of which also hold true for a complexity-based approach. Namely, he holds that a good 
strategy should encourage partnerships between the police and a range of others, is focused 
on data collection and analysis, draws on officer expertise, and values ends over means.369 
The emphasis on partnerships is about the police forming new network ties with other 
organizations and leveraging those ties to expand their capabilities. Data collection and 
 
366 David Weisburd and Anthony Braga, “Problem-Oriented Policing: The Disconnect between 
Principles and Practice,” in Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives, ed. David Weisburd and Anthony 
Braga, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 198–99.  
367 Eck, “Why Problem-Oriented Policing,” 169–70. 
368 Eck, 166. 
369 Eck, 174. 
85 
analysis is needed not just for the mapping and analysis of complex systems and networks, 
but will become increasingly important, as information dominance becomes the primary 
mode of conflict in the Information Age. Utilizing the expertise of officers leverages 
adaptive learning. Finally, the valuing of ends over means emphasizes a break with the 
linear epistemology of the standard model and the associated fascination with statistics. 
Statistics will likely still have a place, probably to identify and quantify problems, but an 
emphasis on ends devalues relatively meaningless statistics like the number of arrests 
made, stops conducted, and average response time, which can obscure if true progress is 
being made. 
3. Community Policing 
A closely related model of policing is the community-policing model, which was 
also born out of a dissatisfaction with the standard model of policing. Whereas Goldstein 
was critical of the reactive nature of the standard model, community policing’s advocates 
were unhappy with the widening gulf between police officers and the communities they 
served. They believed that the technological advances (particularly the automobile) and 
professionalization movement that recast police departments as the sole providers of public 
safety led to an isolation of officers that eroded the bonds between police officers and 
community members.370 Developed in response to these observations, community 
policing is about building civic engagement and developing “new channels for learning 
about neighborhood problems.”371 
Generally, community policing can be described as having three “densely 
interrelated” dimensions: citizen involvement, problem solving, and decentralization.372 It 
is difficult to draw a bright line between community policing and problem-oriented 
policing. For example, one DOJ publication uses both the SARA model and Eck’s crime 
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triangle in explaining the problem-solving dimension of community policing.373 Critics of 
community policing often point to the “ambiguity and flexibility [that] give [s] community 
policing its all-things-to-all people character.”374 Perhaps the best way to understand the 
difference between the two is where the emphasis lies; problem-oriented policing 
emphasizes the study of and compilation of solutions to problems, while community 
policing emphasizes forming relationships and partnerships with the community.  
Advocates of community policing call for devolving decision-making power to 
individual police officers to give them the ability to learn and respond to the particular 
circumstances and problems in the communities in which they work.375 Importantly, 
community policing advocates criticized deployment strategies that “treat patrol officers 
as interchangeable parts.”376 What community policing envisions is having police officers 
act independently, learn from and adapt to their particular environments, optimize efforts 
through trial and error, and to reorganize policing to recognize the importance of the very 
particular relationships of unique officers to very particular circumstances; in short, to act 
like agents within a complex adaptive system. Although they are not using the language of 
complexity theory, these are calls for policing to begin acting in the complex domain. 
Studies of the effectiveness of community policing have been somewhat mixed. 
Some of the best analysis comes from a decade long project in Chicago, which applied 
letter grades to various outcomes. Chicago’s community policing efforts scored high in 
public involvement (B), partnerships with other agencies (A), and internal organization 
(A); problem solving, on the other hand, only earned a score of C.377 Even advocates of 
community policing concur that it does not appear to reduce crime rates much, but note 
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that it does reduce non-crime disorder problems and appears to increase perceptions of 
police legitimacy.378 This result suggests that informing community-policing efforts with 
an explicit grounding in complexity and network theories may improve problem solving 
efforts. Alternatively, community policing might be an effective way to apply the narrative 
level of netwar, deliberately seeking to connect and influence with as many networks as 
possible in the community. 
One issue with community policing is that it tends to be geographically oriented, 
much like the standard model and Compstat. Officers assigned to community policing 
initiatives are often assigned to and kept within specific geographic boundaries.379 
Defining these geographic areas can be an issue, particularly in dynamic neighborhoods. 
Boundaries and compositions of neighborhoods can change faster than the police can keep 
up with, and when the organization of these initiatives are focused around police 
subdivisions, community representatives often only have a portion of their constituents 
within any given police beat.380 
Additionally, many community-policing advocates have an infatuation with foot 
patrols. This infatuation appears to be an outgrowth of the 1981 Newark Foot Patrol 
experiment, which was a foundational study in what would become community 
policing.381 The general theory is that removing officers from patrol vehicles will lead to 
increasing interactions with members of the public and rebuild connections between the 
police and the community. However, at least one study found that community-policing 
officers actually engaged in less interaction with the community than patrol officers did 
because they spent more of their on-duty time in meetings.382 Additionally, that same 
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study found that community officers spent more time with “respectable” citizens than 
marginalized ones.383 
The belief that foot patrol will automatically lead to more community engagement 
seems to be based on a somewhat romanticized view of the past, when society was less 
extensively networked and neighborhoods were perceived as more central to community 
life. It appears that calls for increased foot patrol are falling victim to means over ends 
thinking and indirectly calling for what is desired; perhaps because what is desired is not 
truly recognized. What a desire for community engagement is actually calling for is for 
police departments and individual officers to form ties to the many different networks that 
form communities. Grounding policing in complexity and network theory would instead 
provide the tools to demand directly and explicitly and model these sorts of interactions to 
provide a structure to community policing initiatives, as well as the tools to identify social 
networks that an agency has not formed even a weak tie to. An emphasis on foot patrol 
without being fully cognizant of the emerging network society is confusing a tactic with a 
strategy. In a time when both citizens and criminals are both more interconnected and 
mobile than ever, police agencies that want to increase engagement, enhance legitimacy, 
and fight crime can ill afford to make this mistake.  
4. Focused Deterrence 
Focused deterrence (also known as “pulling levers”) is a model of policing that 
traces its origins back to the Boston Gun Project, which was an application of problem-
oriented policing to the city’s youth homicide problem in the mid-1990s.384 This project, 
implemented as Operation Ceasefire, specifically targeted identified gang members and 
pulled them into meetings known as call-ins. During a call-in, gang members would meet 
with law enforcement, clergy, social workers, victims, and family members affected by 
violence, and other identified members of the community; a united message of moral 
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condemnation of violence would be presented along with offers of services for those 
members who wanted to take up the offer.385 Law enforcement officials present informed 
the gang members that they were known to law enforcement, specific enforcement would 
be targeted based upon violence, and that enhanced measures (such as filing of cases in 
federal court instead of city court) would be employed in this enforcement.386 Operation 
Ceasefire resulted in reductions of 63% in youth homicides and large reductions in 
associated shootings and sounds of gunshots calls.387 
This approach has been replicated in other cities and is becoming considered a 
distinct model of policing in its own right. Focused deterrence as a model consists of five 
components: identification and focus on a very specific problem, research to identify 
groups of offenders, assembling partners to work with law enforcement, using both law 
enforcement and social services, and direct communication with offenders about what will 
trigger enforcement.388 Focused deterrence has generally been employed to target gang 
violence, drug market interventions, and those deemed to be “high-risk offenders.”389 
Available empirical indicates that focused deterrence is one of the new approaches to 
policing that has the greatest measurable impact on crime.390  
Focused deterrence is also highly compatible with the concept of complexity-based 
policing. Most significantly, the concept of networks is already fundamental to the focused 
deterrence model. Applications of focused deterrence have begun to make extensive use of 
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social network analysis, to both identify problematic individuals and direct their efforts.391 
One landmark study in Chicago, which built a social network out of individuals who had 
been arrested together, discovered “that 70 percent of all non-fatal shootings occur in 
networks comprising less than 6 percent of Chicago’s total population.”392 Several 
evaluations of concluded focused deterrence programs noted significant decreases of 
violence in gangs socially connected to targeted gangs.393 On the other side of the project, 
the success of the original Ceasefire was credited to the Boston police building a “network 
of capacity consisting of dense and productive relationships” with its partners.394 
Successful implementation of focused deterrence recognizes the importance of 
relationships between the various elements; ramped up enforcement is pointless without 
the relationships in place to communicate directly to offenders.395 This focus on 
relationships is a key break from the statistics dominated, linear mindset that often 
currently prevails in law enforcement. Mechanically, if criminals who are behaving as 
adaptive agents in complex adaptive systems cause gang violence and other crime 
problems, then direct communication is an excellent way to affect not only their individual 
adaption but also the emergent behavior of the system as a whole. 
Part of the analysis step of focused deterrence is the development of “group audits” 
where those who are knowledgeable about the gang, drug market, or offender pool in 
question compile and collect their information.396 This strategy recognizes that police 
officers have a large amount of knowledge that goes unused because it is not needed for 
any particular legal proceeding; often, this knowledge makes clear that what may appear 
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to others as random is anything but random.397 This strategy is a first step in moving away 
from a production-dominated organization towards an Information Age organization. With 
information disassociated from the need to produce a specific arrest or prosecution, more 
information is actually processed by the organization than if it employed the standard 
model of policing. When knowledge is only sought out to support a specific arrest, it sends 
the message that the standard model, dominated by producing cases and arrests, is what the 
agency values. Instead, these types of audit sessions are a step towards moving an agency’s 
structuring of information towards an Information Age paradigm. 
As mentioned previously, partnerships with the community are a key component of 
focused deterrence. The inclusion of the ministers of the Ten Point Coalition in Operation 
Ceasefire served as a signal of transparency and accountability that prevented a view of the 
program as just another abusive dragnet.398 It is more than just an example of building 
networks by law enforcement; it is about waging the struggle on the narrative level of 
netwar, both defensively and offensively. In building a network of capacity with the local 
community, law enforcement reinforces a pro-civil society narrative about its operations. 
Directly confronting networked offenders with a unified moral message about the impacts 
and unacceptability of their actions disrupts their shared narrative, and if effective, spreads 
the pro-society narrative throughout the network. 
The original Operation Ceasefire stopped in the year 2000, due to the difficulty in 
keeping the network assembled by the Boston police focused on the same problem over an 
extended time period.399 A complexity-based understanding of policing could help in 
addressing this difficulty. It would recognize that complex adaptive networks are defined 
by the fact that they change over time, and programs to address them must be designed for 
change as well. Moreover, problems are often the manifestations of these networks, so 
focusing on the network instead of the problem prepares the participants for change and 
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may even allow for a metric by which to assess and declare victory, should the network be 
sufficiently altered or disrupted. 
An explicit complexity-based model of policing could guide and improve focused 
deterrence efforts. Problems with the implementation of focused deterrence have often 
included a lack of relationships between law enforcement and other partners, as well as 
insufficient analysis of the targeted problem.400 A complexity-based approach would have 
police officers thinking in terms of networks and relationships automatically, and the 
transition to understanding the primacy of information dominance would emphasize the 
need for robust analysis. While focused deterrence is beginning to make use of social 
network analysis, the focus is still generally on groups that have a conscious association, 
like street gangs. An understanding of complex, dynamic networks would broaden the 
conceptual scope to include self-organizing systems whose individual members do not 
necessarily consciously associate with each other. 
Finally, in a recent evidence-based review of focused deterrence efforts Braga, 
Wesiburd, and Turchan noted the need to “shed some much needed light on the theoretical 
mechanisms underlying focused deterrence policing.”401 They observed that the current 
research could not determine which elements of the focused deterrence programs were 
most effective, but held out hope that advanced statistical analysis methods would help 
quantify the impact of each element and provide guidance for future efforts.402 Of course, 
just as with Compstat, statistical analysis is the wrong method for meaningful analysis of 
complex systems. Indeed, the very strength of focused deterrence is identifying, building, 
and leveraging relationships to impact networks of actors. Focused deterrence is the model 
perhaps the most congruent with law enforcement for the Information Age; attempting to 
apply a linear epistemology to it will not adequately explain how and why it works. 
In conclusion, recognition is growing that the standard model of policing no longer 
appears to be effective, but as yet, little appreciation exists for why that is so. No shortage 
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of alternative models of policing has been proposed to replace it, but none has been 
conceived with the changes to the underlying structure and fundamentals of the network 
society or the Information Age. However, at least some of these models offer some 
practices that may serve as building blocks or stepping stones to the day-to-day operations 
of a complexity-based policing model. 
Compstat is the least useful alternative, as it is statistically driven, which places it 
squarely in a linear view of the world. Problem-oriented policing as it currently exists only 
shallowly engages with complexity, but it emphasizes iterative learning. It is not a large 
conceptual leap to realize that a problem is the manifestation of a complex system’s 
operation and move from the problem to the system as the unit of work. Community-
oriented policing calls for officers to act like adaptive agents in a complex adaptive system, 
but lacks the theoretical foundation to design, measure, and implement effective 
community engagement in the modern world. Focused deterrence is the most aligned with 
a complex, network driven view of the world, but has not explicitly broken free from a 
linear, reductive viewpoint. To the extent that existing alternative models recommend 
practices well-suited to a complex environment, it appears to be either accident or narrowly 
tailored responses to recognized shortcomings of the standard model. Adopting complexity 
as the theoretical underpinning of a model of policing would provide an internally 
consistent means to integrate elements of these various models and address the 
shortcomings of the standard model of policing. 
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VI. SENSE MAKING FOR LEADERS 
The conception of American society as the network society is fundamentally 
different from the more familiar industrial model. A well-developed linear epistemology 
exists for the industrial model, but has not yet been developed for a complex, non-linear 
world. Law enforcement leaders will be called upon to break with their internalized 
assumptions about a profoundly linear world and begin conceptualizing the world as a 
complex environment even as they attempt to adopt a complexity-based model. This 
chapter examines how a structural view of information can help illuminate an embedded 
worldview that may not be immediately obvious. It then examines the tacit importance of 
the concept of order to law enforcement, and how this concept causes discomfort when 
confronting complexity. It offers the Cynefin framework as a method for law enforcement 
leaders to make sense of complex environments in the absence of a true complex 
epistemology. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of an application of movement 
between the various Cynefin domains to complexity-based policing.  
A. INFORMATION STRUCTURING 
The ability to work with information will come to be the measure of effectiveness 
of an organization (or network) in the Information Age. However, as already discussed, 
advanced information processing technology is a necessary, but not sufficient component 
for a truly informational, network society.403 Arquilla and Ronfeldt criticize the tendency 
for theorizing about information to focus solely on information as a message and on 
technological capacity to transmit, store, and otherwise process raw data.404 They propose 
the structural view as a complementary mode of thinking about information. The structural 
view of information holds that in any system with a structure, latently embedded 
information is not being actively “processed,” but is processed via its often-unnoticed 
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presence, influences, and defines the system.405 Structured information acts on “incoming 
information [which] may get restructured before it is absorbed, processed, and/or sent on 
its way…” and so serves as a filter by which the system perceives the world around it.406  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt have identified four elements that form a schematic for a 
structural view of information (Table 1). An ideational superstructure “is the level of ideas 
and ideologies, myths and maxims, values and norms, rites and rituals, laws and rules, etc., 
that define, often abstractly, the nature of a culture and the structures within it.”407 The 
organizational structure element concerns itself with the extent any given organization is 
devoted to information or communications.408 The technological infrastructure element is 
about specific information technologies and their employment or integration.409 The 
interaction between language and conceptual thought, and the importance of vocabulary in 
both conceiving and expressing thought, occurs at the linguistic substructure.410 






All four of these elements must align for policing to evolve into a complexity-based 
model. Other chapters in this thesis have engaged with the technological, linguistic, and 
 
405 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 443–44. 
406 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 445. 
407 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 449. 
408 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 449. 
409 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 450. 
410 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 450. 
411 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 452. 
97 
organizational elements in the structural view. However, if the ideational superstructure of 
policing is not aligned with a non-linear, complex, and networked view of the world, any 
attempt to incorporate a complexity-based model will either prove superficial or fail. The 
tacit presence of embedded information can be expected to exert a strong pressure towards 
linear models of thought until a complete complex epistemology is devised and becomes 
culturally prevalent. 
One powerful example of this concept is the prevalence of chess as a strategic 
metaphor for leaders in many fields. Arquilla and Ronfeldt observe that in chess, “territory 
is very important, units are functionally specialized, and operations proceed sequentially 
until checkmate.”412 They contrast chess with the game of Go, “which is more about 
creating networks of pieces than about protecting hierarchies of pieces.”413 Each game has 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of the world, and what is effective in interacting 
with it silently present and influencing the player’s world view. To adopt a complexity-
based model of policing successfully, leaders in the profession must begin to examine what 
tacit assumptions of linearity are presently embedded in the ideational superstructure and 
begin developing new narratives and metaphors that capture the nature of the network 
society. 
B. ORDER AND UN-ORDER 
A recurring theme in the literature surrounding complexity and netwar is the 
contrast between order and chaos. Kurtz and Snowden observe that this theme is deeply 
embedded in the human psyche and is found in many different mythologies; typically, the 
mythological forces of order establish their domain over the human world, although some 
agents of chaos (often embodied as trickster gods) still remain active in the world.414 They 
trace the prominence of linear, “ordered science” since the Enlightenment back to this 
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presumption of existence as a fundamentally ordered domain.415 However, the study of 
complexity theory has illustrated that the world is not simply divided into linear, structured 
order and pure, unknowable randomness. Instead, a non-linear realm exists with its own 
set of knowable dynamics where emergent organization can arise. Kurtz and Snowden call 
this domain un-order to differentiate it from linearity, but signal that dynamics still govern 
the domain.416 
This underlying presumption of linear order is especially appealing to law 
enforcement officers and their leadership, and it is almost certainly part of the profession’s 
ideational superstructure. Law enforcement popularly conceives of itself as “the thin blue 
line” separating order from chaos. The most successful law enforcement officers tend to 
be those who are temperamentally inclined to calm down excited situations and restore 
adherence to norms and rules in disorderly situations. Law enforcement’s view of the world 
is currently greatly centered in the linear epistemology. Kurtz and Snowden explicitly 
identify Taylorism as belonging to the ordered view of the world, and Taylorism was 
essential to developing the now-dominant “standard model” of policing.417 The result is 
that psychologically and philosophically, most law enforcement leaders are uncomfortable 
operating in the domain of un-order and view it as a “bad” domain in contrast with the 
“good” domain of order. 
This mindset will not serve in the Information Age and the network society. 
Institutions and leaders that cannot adapt to operating in the domain of un-order will lose 
both legitimacy and effectiveness, and they will be supplanted by those that can. 
Development of a non-linear epistemology is necessary but is beyond the scope of this 
work. However, Snowden’s Cynefin framework (Figure 6) offers a useful guide for 
thinking strategically about operating in non-linear environments. Kurtz and Snowden 
stress that Cynefin is a sense-making framework and not one for categorization; therefore, 
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no domain is “better” than another.418 This point needs to be kept in mind, as they note 
that individuals instinctively try to “pull” problems into the domains within which they are 
comfortable operating.419 The utility of Cynefin for law enforcement leaders is as a guide 
to develop a deep comfort operating in complex environments, and not as a mere survival 
mechanism until they are able to return to highly ordered environments. 
Broadly speaking, the framework is divided between the ordered domains on the 
right, and the domains of un-order on the left (Figure 6). Kurtz and Snowden further 
subdivide it into three “ontological states:” order (where comprehensive knowledge is 
paramount), complexity (where patterns can be conceived), and chaos (too unstable for 
patterns to exist).420 The decision-making model in the ordered domain begins with 
receiving data, determining the right answer, and then taking the mandated action. 
Determining the right answer is a matter of either applying a pre-determined rule or 
consulting with experts, as appropriate to either simple or complicated problems.421 
Decision making works differently for complexity. Due to the non-linear and dynamic 
nature of this domain, gathering information does not lead to fruitful reductive analysis. 
Instead, the key is to probe the system to search for emergent patterns, and then seek to 
amplify desirable patterns and dampen undesirable ones.422 Chaos is so unstable and 
dangerous that immediate action is called for, followed by observing the reactions, and 
then taking further action to continue moving the problem in the desired direction.423 
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Figure 6. The Cynefin Framework with Decision Making Models.424 
Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate the Cynefin framework is to apply these 
domains and decision-making processes to existing uses within law enforcement (Table 2). 
Consider throwing an annual parade for the Fourth of July as an example of the simple 
domain. As the law enforcement requirements will generally be the same year after year, 
it is only necessary to recognize the approach of the holiday and refer to the previous year’s 
plan. The solution already exists. As long as someone discerns the correct category for the 
problem (and does not utilize the Thanksgiving Day parade plan), the correct answer is 
obvious. More complicated would be the planning of a new marathon to be run throughout 
a city, which requires identifying a 26.2-mile course, staging areas, medical facility, and 
support equipment. Here, leadership perceives the need to create a plan but will generally 
be best served by going to those members of the agency who have built up an expertise in 
planning for intricate, large-scale events. While it requires more specialized knowledge, 
the problem yields to reductionism and a detailed plan can be created to successfully run 
the event. 
An excellent example of the complex domain would be a demonstration or protest 
march, particularly of the kind seen throughout the United States in the second half of 2020. 
These marches were executed by groups with sometimes tenuous relationships with law 
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enforcement, often were carried out with minimal collaborative planning with law 
enforcement, and due to a tense environment, often carried the possibility for violence to 
occur. Unlike in the ordered domain, rigid adherence to step-by-step plans is almost 
guaranteed to lead to failure in this situation. Instead, law enforcement leaders needed to 
probe the problem by trying various measures, sensing how the crowd reacted, and then 
amplifying tactics that led to desirable responses and dampening situations or abandoning 
tactics that led to undesirable ones.425 
Finally, chaotic situations are those that are so dangerous that immediate action 
must be taken. The September 11 attacks, or the riot at the U.S. Capitol, are examples of 
these types of situations, which are fortunately rare for law enforcement. In a chaotic 
situation, there is no time to consult a manual or experts, or to study the changes in patterns 
in response to a stimulus. Decisive action is called for, followed by an assessment of how 
circumstances have changed and then continued action with the intention of moving the 
situation out of the chaotic domain and into one of the others.  
Table 2. Application of Cynefin Framework to Police Functions. 
Domain/Decision Making Process Sample Police Activity 
Simple (sense-categorize-respond) 4th of July Parade 
Complicated (sense-analyze-respond) New Marathon 
Complex (probe-sense-respond) Protest/Demonstration March 
Chaotic (act-sense-respond) September 11, U.S. Capitol Riot 
 
 
C. MOVING WITHIN THE CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK 
Complex systems and networks are dynamic, and they are altered by interacting 
with them. Therefore, it is possible to move between domains by way of taking action, and 
Kurtz and Snowden have defined several distinctive movements on the Cynefin framework 
(Table 3). Asymmetric collapse occurs when an organization has settled into a stable 
environmental niche and does not recognize that the governing dynamics have changed, 
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which leads into a collapse into chaos.426 Imposition is the application of force to stabilize 
chaos into easily perceived and reducible problems.427 Exploration is the easing of 
hierarchical control to allow the formation of new connections and facilitate emergent 
properties.428 Just-in-time transfer “involves the selective choice of stable patterns in 
complex space for ordered representation.”429 Finally, swarming is an alternative means 
of moving out of chaos to order by creating multiple opportunities for complex patterns to 
manifest, amplifying desirable ones, and then stabilizing those patterns by moving them 
into a complicated space.430 
Table 3. Cynefin Dynamics.431 
Movement Starting Domain Ending Domain 
Asymmetric Collapse Simple Chaos 
Imposition Chaos Simple 
Incremental Improvement Cycles between simple and complicated 
Exploration Complicated Complex 
Just-in-time Transfer Complex Complicated 
Swarming (Chaos to) Complex Complicated 
 
Imposition is currently the most favored of the Cynefin dynamics by law 
enforcement leaders, owing to their current sense of the world. When crime problems 
become a sufficient priority, the response is often an attempt to “flood the zone” by 
throwing disproportionately large numbers of resources at the problem (often defined as 
much by geographical boundaries in lieu of particular manifestations of the problem) to 
smother it. This response can be maintained for relatively short periods of time, but is 
relatively costly, as other areas and issues must make do with diminished resources. It is 
not that imposition is always the wrong response, but in truly chaotic contexts, it is the 
 
426 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 475–76. 
427 Kurtz and Snowden, 476. 
428 Kurtz and Snowden, 476–77. 
429 Kurtz and Snowden, 477. 
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431 Adapted from Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 476. 
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appropriate and most efficient response. However, too often, complex contexts are viewed 
as chaotic. Applying the Cynefin framework as a sense-making device allows for the 
recognition of complexity as a legitimate domain and prevents a sort of “panic response” 
of automatically resorting to imposition upon realizing that one has left the realm of  
linear order.  
The movements between the complex and complicated domains are useful for 
understanding the elements of a complexity-based approach to policing. Kurtz and 
Snowden have chosen “exploration” as their term for moving from the ordered domain to 
the complex; similarly, “probe” is the first step of the decision-making process for 
complexity. Both of these terms try to convey to leaders that complexity is not a problem 
to be definitively solved, but instead is a problem to be approached iteratively and through 
trial and error. Exploration connotes a sally into complexity to observe the result and 
determine whether to amplify or dampen the outcome. Law enforcement leaders can use 
exploration as a sense-making device when they try to craft interventions in complex 
systems. Instead of committing to a formalized right answer, it is instead to be expected 
that multiple probes will be attempted to monitor responses from the system. Without the 
attachment to a “right” answer, it is easier to abandon efforts that do not lead to desirable 
patterns emerging, as well as prepare multiple alternatives in addition. In adapting law 
enforcement agencies to a complexity-based approach, exploration allows a way to 
envision loosening traditional hierarchy and bureaucracy while still maintaining an 
organizational structure. This mindset will be especially useful if attempting to implement 
the types of blended hierarchies and networks envisioned by Arquilla and Ronfeldt. 
The just-in-time transfer is named for the production model, wherein needed 
resources appear precisely when needed but are not kept on hand before or after.432 
Similarly, when information is pulled out of a complex system for study, it is a reflection 
of the system at that moment. The system is not static; the future will be different from the 
present observation and people must be very careful about attempting to determine 
necessary interactions and outcomes that occurred in the past. In a complexity-based 
 
432 Kurtz and Snowden, 477. 
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policing model, it will at times be necessary to pull knowledge from the complex domain 
into the complicated to take action on it. One example could be using a network model to 
choose and make an intervention by removing a key node by an arrest or other means. The 
just in time mindset affirms that this information is generated at the moment it is needed 
for a specific purpose and cautions against a broader use. It is tempting to fall back into a 
reductionist mindset and believe that this image of the system represents a necessary 
outcome of prior conditions or will hold for the future. Leaders must remember that while 
they can interact with and manipulate complex systems, those systems will still defy 
accurate predictions despite detailed study. 
Finally, Kurtz and Snowden identify swarming as an alternative path out of chaos 
from imposition; where imposition moves directly from chaos to the simple domain by the 
application of force, swarming moves into the complex, and then into the complicated. 
Swarming functions by employing multiple gambits or probes and seeing if emergent 
patterns form in response to them. Once these patterns have been recognized, they can be 
amplified if desirable, and then an intervention can be crafted to move from the complex 
domain into the complicated. The conception of swarming for Kurtz and Snowden as a 
sense-making technique is similar to the tactical conception devised by Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt.433 Both senses of swarming involve multiple points of contact with the system, 
designed both to act and gather or distribute data, and to determine what is effective and 
discard what is not. 
The earlier illustration of applying the Cynefin framework to policing drew upon 
the crowd control function of a police department because it is an area where successful 
leaders are already operating across the four domains, even if not conceived of or 
recognized as such. When it comes to the law enforcement aspect of policing, the standard 
model and thinking squarely in the ordered domains still reign supreme. However, the 
network society has arrived, and complex dynamics are driving more and more aspects of 
society, to include crime. Although individual days or cases may exist in the other domains, 
 
433 Their conception does not involve starting from a chaotic space, but is otherwise very similar in 
function. 
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the daily leadership and strategy of policing must operate in the complex domain. A failure 
to adapt to this new complex reality, to continue to treat crime and policing as a simple or 
complicated problem, will lead to asymmetric collapse. The widespread unrest and police 
legitimacy crisis in 2020 may be a warning sign that policing is headed towards this 
collapse. 
Applying the Cynefin framework may help law enforcement leaders recognize and 
make sense of complex environments. The perception of the police as the border between 
order and chaos is fundamental to their self-conception and influences their decision 
making. Narratives are important; Arquilla and Ronfeldt identify the narratives that an 
organization tells about itself, to itself, as one of the five levels of netwar. For policing, this 
narrative currently leads the profession astray. Policing is so grounded in the ordered 
domains and linear epistemology, and unfamiliar with complexity, that any perception of 
un-order is immediately assumed to be chaos. This misidentification of chaos often leads 
to the selection of imposition as the tactic of choice, even though it is mismatched to the 
complex domain and will be ineffective or counterproductive. Cynefin provides a narrative 
understanding of complexity (as opposed to a strictly technical one) and differentiates it 
from chaos; even though complexity also exists in the domain of un-order, it has a structure 
and is not chaotic. This justifies complexity as a legitimate domain for law enforcement to 
operate within and preserves the current narrative understanding as defending against the 
encroachment of chaos. In this way, law enforcement leadership can begin building 
epistemological comfort in the complex domain while also building the technical skills and 
knowledge needed to operate in a complex environment. 
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VII. FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In their edited volume on police reform, scholars David Weisburd and Anthony 
Braga write, “often in social systems, the recognition that something must change is 
brought about by a period of crisis or challenge to existing programs or practices.”434 The 
beginning of the 21st century has certainly seen a recognition that the standard model of 
policing is insufficient and that “something must change” in policing. From the law 
enforcement perspective, great emphasis has been placed since the turn of the century on 
studying, developing, and spreading alternatives to the standard model, yet none has been 
able to displace it as the dominant method of dealing with crime. The second half of 2020 
saw enduring, widespread protests across the country directed against law enforcement and 
the criminal justice system. These protests, sparked by the controversial use of force 
incidents, expressed the profound dissatisfaction still felt by many communities within the 
country about the current state of policing. The sense that the police are “like lifeguards 
frantically swimming against the tide from one incident to another, employing different 
tactics in a disjointed and unfocussed manner with little or nothing to show for it at the end 
of the day” persists.435 
The dissatisfaction with the state of policing occurs because it is an institution that 
is no longer aligned with the dynamics that drive and organize society. Failure to recognize 
this misalignment makes attempting solutions ineffective or inefficient. As non-linear 
processes are increasingly governing society, the harm from failing to adapt to the new 
reality will only accelerate. Law enforcement must reform itself to a model aligned with 
the Information Age to prevent an asymmetric collapse for the profession.  
This thesis started with the question “what would a model of policing based on 
complexity theory look like?” This chapter answers that question by presenting the 
findings, conclusion, and recommendations derived from the preceding chapters. First, this 
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chapter presents a number of findings, which illustrate a number of the frameworks and 
intellectual tools that could be incorporated into a complexity-based model of policing. 
Next, the chapter presents the main conclusion derived from these findings, that a 
complexity-based model of policing must inherently be designed for the Information Age. 
A series of recommendations provide a view of what the operational structure of such a 
model may look like. Finally, the chapter examines several areas of interest for additional 
research and study. 
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis examined what academic literature exists on applying complexity to 
policing and found that the majority of uses envisioned so far are for short-term decision 
making or limited retooling of functions, such as intelligence analysis. However, 
exploration and extension of existing literature revealed a variety of applications of 
complexity and related theories throughout policing. These applications of complexity 
range from immediate and tactical to long-term and strategic employments.  
First, the framework of complex adaptive systems was found to be a useful model 
to understand the behavior of a street robbery problem in Washington, DC. The case study 
revealed that far from being merely an aggregation of separate incidents, the robberies are 
best understood to behave as an interlinked system that responds to changes in the 
environment. The implication of this finding is that crime problems should be attacked as 
complex systems or networks and seek to remove key nodes, inhibit interconnection and 
communication, and change the feedback agents are receiving that is amplifying crime. 
Second, the TIMN framework was found to be a useful model to understand the 
present state of American society. Rapid and profound changes in information and 
communications technology have created dense webs of interconnection between people 
that have unlocked the power of networks to become the primary organizational form in 
modern society. Complexity theory provides the technical explanation for the “power” of 
these networks, as once they become sufficiently dense, they exhibit complex, nonlinear 
behavior. The TIMN framework provides an easy to understand way to relate networks to 
previous social forms and understand how society has transitioned from a production-
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oriented society to an informational society, where the ability to process information 
determines power. 
Third, netwar was found to have mixed applicability at the present moment. It 
provides a useful framework to understand networked conflict in an Information Age 
environment. The most theoretically developed element of netwar is the tactic of swarming. 
Clear evidence for swarming was found in the case study, where the robbery CAS 
effectively utilized swarming against Washington, DC’s hierarchically organized police 
department. However, law enforcement’s current reductionist view of crime means that it 
only collects comprehensive data applicable to the doctrinal level of netwar and very little, 
if any data, connected to the other levels. This lack of data makes it difficult to apply netwar 
to crime conclusively; however, as policing adopts a more systemic or network-oriented 
view of crime, this data deficiency should be resolved and allow for a more definitive 
determination. Alternatively, the five levels of netwar could provide a useful framework 
for evaluating changes made in a law enforcement agency to adapt to a complexity-based 
model. 
Fourth, complexity was found to provide a solid theoretical grounding for 
understanding and interpreting various models of policing. The standard model of policing 
enshrines a linear and production-oriented worldview, which is at odds with the non-linear 
and informational forces coming to dominate society. Four major alternative models of 
policing were examined: Compstat, problem-oriented policing, community policing, and 
focused deterrence. Compstat was found to be the least useful alternative, as it reinforces 
a linear view of the world. The remaining three alternatives all have elements that are 
consistent with complexity but also have gaps in their models that limit their effectiveness. 
Complexity was found to provide tools to fill those gaps and offers the possibility of 
designing a theoretically informed, cohesive model that can combine the best features of 
all three. 
Finally, this thesis found that the Cynefin framework is a useful tool for the 
leadership of police agencies to develop comfort with operating in complex environments. 
Perhaps the key embedded narrative for law enforcement is that of being the line separating 
the social order from chaos and barbarism. This separation hampers an adoption of a 
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complexity-based model, because complexity exists outside of order, but apart from chaos. 
However, the Cynefin framework not only provides a visual diagram of that distinction, 
but also introduces the intellectual concept of un-order to legitimize complexity as a space 
within which law enforcement can work.  
Taken as a whole, these findings show that it is not only possible, but also 
imperative, to reorient policing around a complexity-based model. 
B. CONCLUSION: EVOLVING INTO THE INFORMATION AGE  
Ronfeldt’s TIMN framework has already been presented as a guide to thinking 
about how society has evolved into the network society. Arquilla and Ronfeldt have also 
developed a complimentary four-stage model of conflict, which can be extended into an 
equivalent model of policing for each stage.436 Societal evolution (Table 4) along the 
TIMN framework occurs as technological advancements allow for advancements in 
information gathering, processing, analysis, and exchange. The forms found along each 
successive level of the framework require more sophisticated information processing and 
structuring to function effectively. As each new form is incorporated into society, 
outmoded institutions are either discarded or diminished and their functions assumed by 
newly dynamic and dominant institutions. 
Table 4. Societal Evolution. 
Society Information  Model of Conflict Model of Law Enforcement 
Tribes Simple/Limited Melee Primitive L.E./Thief Takers 
Institutions 
 
 Massing Peel Model 
Markets 
 
Maneuver Standard Model 
Networks 
 
Complex/Emergent Swarming Complexity Based 
 
 
436 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, 7–8. See footnote 4 for an explicit 
connection of this conflict model to the TIMN framework. 
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Society’s means of maintaining public order and enforcing the law has evolved 
along with its process through the TIMN framework. The first level of the framework, the 
tribe, has the least capacity and need for information processing. Its associated mode of 
conflict is the individual melee, which at its most advanced requires only sufficient 
coordination to gather a number of like-minded individuals together, but with conflict 
devolving into a number of individual struggles once joined. Similarly, early law 
enforcement systems were often a matter of individual efforts, with little communication 
or information processing required or occurring. For example, England’s “thief-takers” 
received a bounty for arresting criminals, but they were private individuals who operated 
as independent contractors.437 In colonial America, the sparsely manned watches, sheriffs, 
and constables were few in number and generally operated as independent agents rather 
than a true institutional force.438 
The second level of the framework is the institution. Institutions required organized 
systems of storing, processing, and communicating information to become more effective 
than tribal arrangements. While these advancements were great, the institutional 
information processing ability functions most robustly when dealing with simple and 
complicated problems. The associated mode of conflict is massing, which in many ways 
reached its height in 19th century warfare; hierarchical units functioning in strict 
formations bringing organized force to bear on the opponent and communicating by means 
of written orders and early signaling technologies, such as semaphore and telegraph.439 
Fighting in this fashion required a great deal of discipline, which was installed by relentless 
drill.440 Importantly, this drill not only installed technical competencies in the soldiers, but 
also began structuring information for the institution by embedding information, values, 
and ideas in the worldview of the individuals who made up the organization.441 The 
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equivalent model of law enforcement for this level of the framework is the early modern 
police departments, modeled on the Metropolitan Police Department established by Sir 
Robert Peel in London in 1829 with the adoption of a paramilitary hierarchy, uniforms, 
and discipline.442 By establishing a relatively well-staffed organization and employing a 
system of assigning officers to territorial beats, these institutions were able to bring an 
organized and regulated effort to bear on crime, leveraging an institutional advantage over 
the largely disorganized and individual efforts of previous systems of law enforcement. 
Additionally, these agencies adopted similar communication technologies with the 
installation of telegraph stations and police call boxes.443 Finally, the institutionalization 
of law enforcement began to structure information in the profession by dividing territory 
into beats (and the consequent reliance on maps), the production of reports, and the tracking 
and measuring of various statistics. It is little surprise that with the modern foundation of 
the profession in the Industrial Revolution, a reductionist and linear view of the world was 
deeply embedded within it. 
The third stage of the framework is the market, which requires even more capacity 
for information processing and distribution. It is at the market stage, with its connections 
and interplay between a wide array of agents and a system for introducing and reacting to 
feedback, that complexity begins to emerge.444 Maneuver is the associated form of conflict 
with this stage of the framework. Maneuver warfare came into its own with the spread of 
electronic communication, which allowed for the concentration of forces (often combining 
multiple branches, such as airpower and ground units) at the “decisive point.”445 
Importantly, electronic communication had the effect of “turning armed forces into 
“sensory organizations,” as well as fighting units.”446 The equivalence with the standard 
model of policing is clear. Police officers responding to 911 calls and calling in specialized 
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support (such as detectives, canine, crime scene, helicopters, etc.) is an attempt to 
concentrate the power and resources of the department at the decisive point, in this case, 
individual instances of crime. Patrol units, linked via two-way radio and computer aided 
dispatch also attempt to serve a sensory function by communicating information about 
what they observe to a shift commander. 
The final stage of the framework is the network. Networks require the technological 
advances of the Information Age to create the ubiquitous and dense connections that allow 
complex systems to flourish. Arquilla and Ronfeldt associate their concept of swarming as 
the model of conflict for the network stage of the framework. They note that the primary 
objective of swarming is the disruption of an opponent’s cohesion.447 Complex systems 
and networks rely on the connections between nodes and agents to achieve self-organized 
criticality and function effectively. Disrupting those connections, either by severing them 
or overloading them, destroys the coherence of the system and causes it to dissolve entirely 
or shatter into smaller, less capable and more manageable fragments. 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have argued that society has proceeded into 
the transformation into this last stage of the framework. In particular, crime (along with 
many other aspects of society) is increasingly becoming driven by complex network 
dynamics. An equivalent model of law enforcement needs to be developed that is matched 
to the present environment, which is highly interconnected and non-linear.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It seems somewhat incongruous to offer an explicit design or plan for a complexity-
based model of policing. The idea that a product can be built to a schematic and then 
repeated at scale is firmly entrenched in the linear epistemology and industrial mindset that 
no longer serves as an effective mental model for interpreting the world. The way forward 
likely lies in harnessing the power of complex systems by law enforcement, employing 
useful ideas, and emergent behavior as agencies begin to experiment with complexity-
based and informed models of law enforcement. In this spirit, the following 
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recommendations should not be read as a road map but as a set of attractors that could 
potentially lead to beneficial patterns cohering. These recommendations are grouped into 
three categories: intellectual, workforce, and organizational. 
1. Intellectual 
The first recommendation is to begin explicitly educating law enforcement officers 
in complexity theory, network theory, and related topics. Leadership will need to become 
adept in these areas because they will be overseeing the evolution of law enforcement into 
a new, complexity-based model. Rank and file members also need this knowledge, because 
they will be responsible for actually performing the work in this new model and will need 
to understand how and why their job will be changing. Education for both leaders and 
members will need to occur on both the broad, conceptual level, as well as the detailed 
technical level. 
A second recommendation, following on the first, is to begin developing an 
alternative mindset and corresponding narratives to fit a complex environment. The law 
enforcement mindset is currently a production oriented one, centered on the output of 
reports, investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. This mindset is common across all levels 
of the profession; leadership looks at output levels and what they hope to be correlated 
measures of public safety while the rank and file hopes to advance their career by closing 
cases and bringing in arrests for prosecution. This mindset must be replaced by one that 
thinks in terms of measuring, mapping, and intervening in complex systems.  
Related to developing this new mindset is the need to begin developing new, high-
level narratives about law enforcement. This new narrative is the “ideational 
superstructure” identified by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, which sits atop their structural view of 
information. These narratives are needed first to ensure the proper realignment of the law 
enforcement organization to a complexity-based one. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the current predominant narrative that law enforcement officers are agents of order does 
cause discomfort and an instinctual aversion to any departure from the ordered domains. If 
the narratives embraced by an organization have an inherently linear, industrial character, 
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any attempts truly to evolve the organization are likely to either fail or become yet another 
passing fad that does not truly displace the standard model of policing. 
2. Workforce 
Frontline law enforcement officers are going to have to become much more like 
data scientists than they currently are to perform effectively in a complexity driven 
environment. However, police officers are already required to wear a large number of hats: 
diplomat, tactician, coach, parent, counselor, paramedic, and law enforcement officer. 
Adding an additional skillset to that mix is not an optimal path to ensuring expert 
competency or ensuring sufficient time is available to perform the data analysis needed. 
Therefore, while police officers will need a working knowledge of this subject matter, and 
should be encouraged to become practitioners, agencies should hire analysts to focus on 
the information management and analysis aspect of working with complex systems and 
networks. 
These analysts should have or receive both education and training in applications 
of complexity theory and network analysis. They will need to utilize specialized computer 
software to perform various analyses of complex networks and organize the vast amounts 
of information that will increasingly become the lifeblood of information-age agencies. 
These analysts should be considered an operational position, equivalent to sworn officers, 
and deploying out of the office into the field when appropriate and as much as possible.  
The successful integration of these analyst positions requires the intellectual 
recommendations outlined earlier so that previous missteps from attempts to integrate 
intelligence analysts can be avoided. Management often frequently utilizes analysts 
because they possess technological skills to produce maps and other documents focused on 
quantifying the present state of crime and not strategic in nature.448 In an Information Age 
environment, analysts need to be viewed as operational personnel to free them from tasking 
as support staff by agency management. With all levels of the agency possessing an 
underlying theoretical framework and orientation, products demanded of analysts are more 
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likely to be aligned with strategic and operational goals and less about simple counting. 
One study of intelligence analysts in the United Kingdom found that poor data quality 
(gathered mainly from reports completed by police officers) not only hampered their ability 
to conduct meaningful analysis but also resulted in their products being devalued by the 
field officers, because they knew bad data was being input.449 The orientation of all levels 
of the agency in an informational, complex network view of crime should avoid this 
problem because the focus and incentives align with the recording of high quality, pertinent 
data and move away from mere production of reports, regardless of their quality. 
A final recommendation is to leverage the interdisciplinary nature of complexity. 
In his 1948 paper that sparked the inquiry into complexity, Weaver spoke of the approach 
used by the English, and later the Americans, in winning the Battle of the Atlantic against 
German U-boats in the Second World War. Weaver noted that operational analysis teams 
were formed to plan and adjust strategy; these teams contained not only the expected 
professionals like mathematicians and engineers but also included professionals from a 
wide variety of other fields seemingly unrelated to naval strategy.450 Some of these other 
experts, such as an endocrinologist and an X-Ray crystallographer, were recognized as key 
members of English teams.451 To that end, it is recommended that law enforcement 
agencies develop limited-term fellowships for academics and professionals in unrelated 
fields to work on systems analysis for the agency. Hopefully, these fellowships would 
result in the agency reaping unexpected insight, as well as helping to form the crucial weak 
ties to other networks that are essential in the Information Age. 
3. Organizational 
Day-to-day operations of police agencies will have to change significantly to 
implement a complexity-based model of policing successfully. Basic procedures and 
organization communicate information about an agency to its members and law 
enforcement leaders will need to examine what aspects of their current operations tacitly 
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communicate a grounding in a linear, production-oriented view of the world to their 
members. The following recommendations are not sufficient to serve as a ground up 
reimagining of a police agency, but serve as potential starting points to adopt a complexity-
based model. 
First, agencies should divorce themselves from patrolling based upon beats. Police 
beats are inherently linear and reductionist and are based upon the flawed concept of 
controlling territory. In the modern world, where individuals are both more mobile and 
interconnected than ever before, complex networks of criminals are not limited to discrete 
geographical areas. Geographic divisions will likely remain necessary for some 
administrative purposes, and some features of the physical world will determine a location-
based deployment of officers, but these deployments should be greatly limited.452 Systems 
and networks, not maps, should be the main drivers of the deployment of officers. 
Abandoning police beats as a fundamental concept will have significant effects on 
how police agencies are organized. Many patrol sections are organized around staffing 
beats and various aggregations of beats form administrative subdivisions, commanded and 
controlled through a paramilitary hierarchy. The netwar doctrine holds that hierarchies 
struggle to confront networked adversaries, and that governments will need to combine 
both hierarchical and network forms of organization to cope with this new dynamic.453 
Police departments should reorganize away from territorial patrol into squads headed by a 
sergeant (or equivalent first line supervisor). 
Each of these squads should be a mixed unit of both sworn officers and analysts. 
Again, previous lessons learned from intelligence-led policing’s attempts to integrate 
analysts into police departments inform the logic of this recommendation. Analysts can 
collect and search out higher quality information and produce a better product when they 
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interact with their clients who is tasking or requesting their services.454 One study of 
intelligence-led policing found that first line supervisors mimic both officers and 
management in their use of analysis, which suggests that they may actually be more 
important customers for analytic products than line officers may.455 Complexity-based 
policing’s analysts are envisioned as operational personnel, working side-by-side with 
police officers in the field as much as possible and integrated fully into the base operational 
units. In addition to providing plenty of interaction with the sworn personnel, it provides 
opportunities for each role to inform the other about priorities; sworn personnel can ask for 
additional information about observations they have made in the field, while analysts can 
inform sworn officers to look for particular things. First line supervisors, who are already 
well positioned to make use of analytic products, can fuse the efforts of each half of the 
squad and direct them towards a common purpose. Above all, these analysts need to be 
regarded as line personnel, on par with the sworn officers and devoted full time to these 
operations. Management needs for support staff and supplementary analysis should be the 
domain of separate, dedicated personnel. 
To enable these teams to focus on complex networks of bad actors, the primacy of 
responding to 911 calls should be reevaluated. The development of the modern 911-call 
system led to a feedback loop of increasing demand for police service leading to increased 
capacity and repeating again.456 With 911 response increasingly driving day-to-day police 
operations, and the Taylorism prevalent in the professionalization movement, it is no 
surprise that the measurement and improvement of various statistical measures (such as 
average response time, units available, calls resolved per hour, etc.) came to define attempts 
to improve police performance. However, complex systems do not yield to such measures, 
and cannot be defeated by continued attempts to shave seconds off a response to a 911 call. 
Moreover, the primacy of 911 response inherently entrenches a production-oriented 
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mindset, as it sets the individual crime or incident as the unit of work; each leads to the 
production of various “products,” such as reports, investigations, and arrests, and cements 
the mirage that efficient production can decompose a complex network. 
Currently, if a patrol shift has 40 officers at work, the vast majority, if not all, of 
the officers will be assigned to various beats and tasked with responding to 911 calls. Under 
the recommended team-based approach, the shift would be broken into anywhere from four 
to six teams, composed of both officers and analysts, and each headed by a first line 
supervisor. One or two teams would be tasked with the primary duty of responding to 911 
calls for the shift, and the rest would be tasked with working on various problems 
(understood as manifestations of complex systems). All teams would still be linked by 
radio communication, and could be diverted to emergency assignments, crimes occurring 
close to their present location, or as otherwise necessary when deemed so by management. 
Even in a complexity-based model of policing, 911 calls will need to be answered, but 
should not be the primary focus of activity for the shift.457 
Finally, departments will need to begin consciously building networks of resources 
they can bring to bear on the complex networks they begin mapping. As networks are 
identified as being responsible for various crimes and other problems, the department can 
begin crafting interventions. Critical nodes in the networks can be targeted for removal or 
attempts to impede or degrade their ability to communicate with the other nodes in the 
network. Many of these interventions are likely to be the familiar tools of arrest and 
prosecution. The experience with focused deterrence shows that when police agencies 
build networks of capacity with other governmental agencies and community resources, 
additional interventions can be staged beyond simply arresting lawbreakers. Additionally, 
once networks have been mapped and critical nodes identified, non-traditional 
interventions could be attempted, such as high quality and individually targeted educational 
or employment opportunities.458 Whatever interventions are selected, the impact on the 
 
457 The present political movement to reevaluate what types of 911 calls should result in a police 
response could provide an opportunity for departments to reduce their call volumes. 
458 These non-traditional interventions may also be useful in situations where critical nodes in a 
network are not engaged in criminal activity themselves, but do serve to tie many others together. 
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complex network must be evaluated and then stabilized if desirable. If desirable patterns 
are not forming in the system, alternative methods should be selected and tried. 
D. AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Little literature is available on complexity and policing, and most discussions of 
the Information Revolution and policing focus merely on integrating new IT into existing 
paradigms. Therefore, the field is largely open for further research about the topics 
contained in this thesis.  
One area that will be greatly important for further research is on the actual 
implementations of complex network analysis in a law enforcement setting and attempts 
to implement the suggestions offered previously. This thesis is concerned with laying out 
a theoretical grounding for a complexity-based model of policing; practical efforts in the 
field are likely to yield new insights and refinements to the theory. Additionally, practical 
work will help develop the tools, techniques, and knowledge base to implement a 
complexity-based model fully. 
A second area for further research is into the distinction between a complex 
adaptive system and a complex adaptive network. This thesis builds off previous research 
about crowds as complex adaptive systems.459 In a crowd control context, CAS theory 
appears to be the most useful framework to understand the dynamics governing crowd 
behavior, as the behavior of the system and not individual agents, is important. However, 
it seems that while CAS theory provides a critical insight into the dynamics of crime 
problems, such as street robberies, the behavior and attributes of individual nodes become 
much more important. Therefore, the author would propose addressing these as complex 
adaptive networks. This term denotes that the network will behave like a complex adaptive 
system, but the use of network emphasizes the importance and focus on individual nodes. 
Further research should indicate if it is a meaningful or useful distinction. 
A third area of research is on the ethics and philosophy of a complexity-based 
worldview. What is the role and value of an individual embedded in these systems? To 
 
459 Leverone, “Crowds as Complex Adaptive Systems.” 
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what extent, if any, do complexity and network dynamics outweigh free will? What level 
of monitoring and intervention in such systems and networks is ethical? What are the ethics 
of purposely trying to fragment a complex network, particularly if some key nodes of the 
network are not involved in criminal activity? All these questions (and more) have 
important implications about what ought to be done, and what society will accept, versus 
what can be done. At a bare minimum, professional ethics for law enforcement will need 
to begin devising answers to some of these questions, although they have value for the 
broader society as well. 
Related to this field will be legal thought about complex systems. As law 
enforcement begins thinking about and responding to crime in terms of complex systems 
and networks, a spillover effect is likely in the legal system. Questions about surveillance 
and information privacy will take on more importance than ever before in a world where 
information processing is the key measure of power. If law enforcement strategy becomes 
driven by network dynamics, on some level, so will prosecutions as prosecutors rely on 
law enforcement to bring defendants before the courts. Should this scenario become 
explicit? Criminal charges can be brought for being part of explicit criminal organizations, 
thus, should similar ones be brought for playing an outsized role in a self-organized 
system? Should the value of someone’s position in a complex network play a role in 
sentencing? These questions are not only philosophical ones, but also technical ones. To 
what extent is this new understanding of the world consistent with or in conflict with 
established legal precedent? Are existing precedents sufficient to guide the law in these 
areas? What types of new laws need to be written? 
E. FINAL REMARKS 
This thesis has presented an argument for a fundamental reinterpretation of 
policing, based upon establishing a new worldview and intellectual framework for the 
profession. Although different groups have different grievances with the current policing 
model, widespread agreement states that policing and law enforcement are in need of 
change. This thesis has argued that it is vital to recognize that society in the United States 
is transitioning into an informational, network-based society increasingly governed by 
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nonlinear, dynamic processes. Law enforcement cannot produce its way out of the current 
dilemma. Indeed, the attempt to produce more arrests and more prosecutions, no matter 
how efficiently, is likely to make the situation worse. The friction from continuing to force 
an industrial worldview in an informational society will scale nonlinearly. 
One way or another, the current hierarchical model of law enforcement will be 
affected by the network society. Arquilla and Ronfeldt point out that while the death of 
hierarchies has been predicted before in history, what tends to actually happen is the 
diminishment of existing hierarchies (and the rise of new ones).460 The current moment is 
a perilous one for policing, with the prominence of “defund the police” as a meme in 
current discourse. It does offer an opportunity for policing to shed distractions and tasks 
best handled by other government agencies and to focus on the core law enforcement 
mission. As both the public and government officials are reconsidering the mission of 
policing, it is possible for law enforcement to advocate for the wholesale change to the 
profession that evolving to a complexity-based model entails. However, the previous 
examples of diminished hierarchies suggest the possibility that if the profession insists on 
clinging to outdated worldviews and mindsets, policing will emerge greatly diminished. 
Think of a London thief-taker watching the first of Peel’s uniformed Metropolitan 
Police officers leaving their station and patrolling the city streets. Policing today stands at 
the cusp of as great a change in law enforcement, as the fundamental nature of society has 
once again shifted. Crime and societal disorder have embraced complex dynamics and 
network forms of organization, while policing continues to insist on linear, hierarchical 
responses. The profession can choose to embrace change and evolve to match a complex 
society, or it can continue to cling to a familiar, if outdated, worldview. 
 
460 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Looking Ahead,” 459. 
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APPENDIX 
This report is used with permission and is included as it is not publicly available. 
This report has been modified to redact personally identifiable information regarding 
suspects arrested, and to remove information about specific methods, tactics, and 
responses.461 
 
Metropolitan Police Department 
Patrol Services North 
Third District 
 




TO:  Patrol Chief 
  Patrol Services North 
 
FROM: Commander 
  Third District     
      
DATE: September 11, 2019 
 
SUBJECT: Crime Plan to Robberies in the Third District 
 
Overview: 
The Third District has seen a 37% increase in the number of robberies in 2019 when 
compared to the same time period in 2018 (346 vs 253). Sector 1 and Sector 3 have seen 
increases of 69% and 37% respectively during this time period, while Sector 2 has seen an 
increase of 27%.  
In addition, there have been 65 robberies in the past 30 days, which represent a 141% 




461 Commander, Patrol Services North, Third District, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, 
DC, personal communication, September 1, 2019. 
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Robbery Incidents by Sector/PSA (as of 9/10/2019) 











Sector 1 87 93 7% 7 25 257% 
302 50 57 14% 3 19 533% 
304 37 36 -3% 4 6 50% 
Sector 2 102 172 69% 13 23 77% 
305 49 87 78% 6 15 150% 
306 21 37 76% 6 4 -33% 
308 32 48 50% 1 4 300% 
Sector 3 64 81 27% 7 17 143% 
301 21 35 67% 4 8 100% 
303 18 16 -11% 2 3 50% 
307 25 30 20% 1 6 500% 
Total  253 346 37% 27 65 141% 
 
Synopsis: 
Over the last 30 days, the most common method of robbery has been force and 
violence/AWIR (32 robberies) followed by snatch (10 robberies). In addition, during the 
last 30 days eleven (11) gun related robberies were reported in the Third District, but eight 
(8) of those have occurred in the last 7 days (September 3 – September 9, 2019), including 
three (3) commercial gun robberies.  
 
 
Sixty-six percent (66%) of robberies over the past 30 days have involved groups of two or 
more suspects (43 of 65). The most common group sizes are two individuals (19 robberies) 






Attempt - Snatch 1
Gun 8
Commercial - Gun 3
Knife 2
Attempt - Knife 3









Sixty-nine percent (69%) of robberies have occurred during the midnight shift. The most 




In the 60 day period of July 12 – September 9, 2019, there have been forty-three (43) 
individuals arrested for Robbery (or Receiving Stolen Property that had been taken in a 
robbery) in the Third District. Of the 43, 27 of them were juveniles at the time of arrest 
(those highlighted below): 
 










Robberies by Suspect Count
Aug 11 - Sep 9, 2019
Shift/Day MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT SUN Total
Day 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 6
Evening 2 0 3 4 0 1 4 14
Midnight 3 2 4 1 5 15 15 45
Total 5 2 8 7 6 17 20 65
Robberies by Shift and Day




The Criminal Research Specialists will be asked to review juvenile court records to 
ascertain the case and detention status of these juveniles. In the event that it is learned that 
juvenile offenders have been released into the community, home visits will be conducted 
by PSA officers to encourage compliance with their conditions of release. In addition, 
members will familiarize themselves with individuals currently under supervision by 
Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) or Court Social Services (CSS) so 
that response to crimes in progress can include visits to these residences.  
 
Trends: 
When analyzing the sixty-five (65) robberies that have taken place in the past the past 30 
days (August 11-September 9), the following has been determined: 
 
Day of Week: Sun (20); Mon (5); Tue (2); Wed (8); Thu (7); Fri (6); Sat (17)  
• Time of Day: Day (6); Eve (14); Mid (45)  
 
Density Maps: 
Analysis of the robberies that have taken place in the past 30 days vs the 30 days prior 
shows a shift in the geographic area are where the robberies are occurring. What had 
previously been an area bounded by 16th Street to the west, V Street/Florida Avenue to the 
north, North Capitol Street to the east, and S Street to the south has shifted to the west and 
north. The Columbia Heights area has now seen a considerable uptick in the number of 
reported robberies in the past 30 days. Both of these areas include commercial corridors 
CCN Arresting Agency Arrest Number# Arrest Date Arrest Location Arrest PSA Arrest Category
     
18140494 MPD 101924335 8/1/2019 1620 V STREET NW 301 Robbery
19119635 MPD JU1922489 7/15/2019 3031 14TH STREET NW 302 Robbery
19119635 MPD JU1923227 7/22/2019 1305 COLUMBIA ROAD NW 302 Robbery
19119790 MPD JU1924839 8/6/2019 3636 16TH STREET NW 302 Robbery
19121033 MPD 031922654 7/17/2019 1620 V STREET NW 301 Robbery
19121649 MPD JU1922102 7/12/2019 1722 6TH STREET NW 308 Robbery
19121649 MPD JU1922103 7/12/2019 1722 6TH STREET NW 308 Robbery
19121649 MPD JU1922104 7/12/2019 1728 6TH STREET NW 308 Robbery
19122188 Metro 511922175 7/12/2019 700 M STREET NW 308 Robbery
19122241 MPD 031922185 7/12/2019 2016 GEORGIA AVENUE NW 305 Robbery
19123966 MPD JU1922453 7/15/2019 1317 COLUMBIA ROAD NW 302 RSP
19124864 MPD 091924014 7/29/2019 600 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE NW 308 Robbery
19127703 MPD 101924313 8/1/2019 3120 16TH STREET NW 302 Robbery
19127912 MPD 031923159 7/21/2019 125 Q STREET NW 308 Robbery
19127912 MPD 031923161 7/21/2019 125 Q STREET NW 308 RSP
19128376 Metro JU1923233 7/22/2019 1305 COLUMBIA ROAD NW 302 Robbery
19131480 MPD 031924025 7/29/2019 637 FLORIDA AVENUE NW 306 Robbery
19131480 MPD 031924026 7/29/2019 1800 7TH STREET NW 305 Robbery
19134659 Metro JU1924258 7/31/2019 1104 7TH STREET NW 307 Robbery  
19134659 Metro JU1924268 7/31/2019 1104 7TH STREET NW 307 Robbery
19141372 MPD 031925337 8/11/2019 3160 16TH STREET NW 302 Robbery    
19141372 MPD 031925338 8/11/2019 3160 16TH STREET NW 302 Robbery
19141372 MPD JU1925335 8/11/2019 1400 IRVING STREET NW 302 Robbery
19141372 MPD JU1925360 8/11/2019 3020 14TH STREET NW 302 Robbery
19142593 MPD JU1925528 8/13/2019 1306 U STREET NW 305 Robbery
19142593 MPD JU1925530 8/13/2019 1306 U STREET NW 305 Robbery
19142593 MPD JU1925531 8/13/2019 1810 13TH STREET NW 305 Robbery
19142622 MPD JU1925519 8/13/2019 1306 U STREET NW 305 Robbery
19142622 MPD JU1925520 8/13/2019 1306 U STREET NW 305 Robbery
19142622 MPD JU1925521 8/13/2019 1810 13TH STREET NW 305 Robbery
19145200 MPD 031925960 8/16/2019 1919 14TH STREET NW 305 Robbery
19147612 MPD 091926290 8/20/2019 2041 GEORGIA AVENUE NW 306 Robbery
19147612 MPD 091926291 8/20/2019 2041 GEORGIA AVENUE NW 306 Robbery
19152667 MPD JU1927245 8/30/2019 1620 V STREET NW 301 Robbery
19152669 MPD JU1927256 8/30/2019 1620 V STREET NW 301 Robbery
19153320 Metro 511927156 8/29/2019 700 M STREET NW 307 Robbery
19154295 MPD JU1927337 8/31/2019 1030 FAIRMONT STREET NW 304 Robbery
19154295 MPD JU1927339 8/31/2019 1030 FAIRMONT STREET NW 304 Robbery
19157876 MPD JU1927890 9/5/2019 1700 IRVING STREET NW 302 Robbery
19159007 MPD JU1928081 9/7/2019 815 V STREET NW 305 Robbery
19159007 MPD JU1928082 9/7/2019 815 V STREET NW 305 Robbery
19159364 MPD 031928143 9/7/2019 1220 7TH STREET NW 307 Robbery
19159364 MPD JU1928141 9/7/2019 1220 7TH STREET NW 307 Robbery
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and Metro stations. There are many nightlife establishments in these areas that may 
contribute to the number of victims. Evening and Midnight shifts are the most heavily 




Plan of Action:  
 
Remaining portion of document has been redacted to protect methods and tactics. 
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